


MILITARY AFFAIRS





The History of the AAF

First of the armed services to publish a bound historical volume (*Official Pictorial History of the AAF*, Winter 1947) the Air Historical Office has now completed and sent to press (University of Chicago) Volume I of the official history, publication of which is awaited with much interest by the historical field. Scheduled to appear early next spring this volume covers the development of the Army air arm from 1939 to the summer of 1942, the period just prior to the start of extensive air operations overseas. This book and its companion numbers of the seven-volume history of the AAF in World War II are being prepared under a unique, and efficient, cooperative system whereby the editors, writers and administrative personnel are widely separated. The editors are Frank Wesley Craven of New York University and James Lea Cate of the University of Chicago. A majority of the writers are former members of the Air Historical Office who are now teaching in universities, and the remainder of the contributors are members of the Historical Office, which also provides administrative, research, editorial and clerical personnel necessary to the completion of the project. The affairs of the office are administered by Colonel W. J. Paul, Chief; Dr. Albert F. Simpson (Air member of the Editorial Board, *Military Affairs*), Air Historian; Lt. Col. G. C. Cobb, Executive; Major Arthur J. Larsen, Chief of Historical Studies and Editorial Branch; and Dr. Chauncey Sanders, Chief of Sources and Reference Branch.

The Air Historical Office was established in the fall of 1942, at that time to supervise historical sections both in this country and overseas, prepare special studies, create and maintain an archives of selected documents, and now to write the official history. Volumes II and III, which cover operations in Europe and the Mediterranean from August 1942 to the end of the war; Volumes IV and V, which similarly cover the Pacific and CBI, and Vol. VI, which deals with the Zone of the Interior, are in the process of being written. Volume II is expected to appear in the fall of 1948. Volume VII, Services and Evaluation, will have to await completion of the other six volumes, but is scheduled to be in the hands of the publishers by the end of 1950.

MILITARY AFFAIRS

The Journal of the American Military Institute

Vol. XI

FALL 1947

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
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COVER: Carrying the title of "The General Attack on the Bataan Peninsula," this is a reproduction of a photograph of a wartime painting by a Japanese artist named Mukai, showing American prisoners in the foreground who, undoubtedly, were the vanguard of the ill-famed "Death March." The artist described the scene as follows: "On April 3, 1942, the orders came for an all out attack upon the 40,000 U. S. and Philippine troops which had been obstinately resisting in the natural fastnesses of Bataan, and the curtain was raised on a war of annihilation. The painting shows the early morning scene, with smoke from Corregidor arising in the distant center. At the left, Caballo Island is dimly shown, while from the left hand side appears the smoke from the ammunition dumps which the enemy has fired."

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THE SECOND BATTLE OF BATAAN MARCH 15-APRIL 9, 1942



A sketch of the Bataan Peninsula battle area.

BATAAN DIARY OF MAJOR ACHILLE C. TISDELLE¹

EDITED BY LOUIS MORTON²

Introduction

The diary kept by Major Achille C. Tisdelle portrays vividly the progressive disintegration of American resistance in the Philippines, and is the most valuable single document dealing with the surrender of Bataan on April 9, 1942. Its importance is enhanced by the paucity of records for the first Philippine campaign, which are sketchy and difficult to obtain. Most organizational records were destroyed before they could fall into enemy hands; some were buried and later recovered. Only a handful were sent out of the Philippines by submarine during the last days of Corregidor, and they dealt mostly with personnel and financial matters. The historian is therefore forced to reconstruct the campaign from diaries, interviews, informal accounts by survivors, and reports made by General Wainwright and other commanders at the end of the war.

Many men kept personal diaries during the fighting. When they were taken prisoner, some buried or burnt them. Others were able to secrete the diaries on their persons in one

way or another and keep them through their four years in prison camps. Most of these diaries are rich in the details of life in a Japanese prison camp, but have a limited value for the military historian. Major Tisdelle's diary is an exception. As aide to General King, the Major was in a position to gain reliable information and to be present at conferences where important decisions were made. He accompanied the General on his inspections and talked frequently with staff officers on Corregidor and Bataan. His observations and comments when checked against other known sources prove reliable in every respect.

The unique value of the diary is increased by the fact that General King kept no diary of his own. When the war broke out he directed Major Tisdelle to keep a diary for him to which he could refer when the necessity arose. Most of the entries were made at the Major's discretion, but from time to time the General asked Tisdelle to make note of a certain event or fact. In a sense, therefore, this diary may be considered as General King's.

Major Tisdelle kept a diary throughout the campaign and continued it through his years in prison camps. The method he used to keep the little notebook in which he recorded his experiences from the prison guards is in itself an interesting story. When he was captured it was tied between his legs, beneath his groins; later it was kept in different places and when he could get advance information on a "shake-down" inspection, it would be in the pocket of a recently washed shirt on the clothes line, in full view of the searchers!

¹Major Tisdelle, was called to active duty as a reserve officer in 1940 and arrived in the Philippines in May 1941. After a tour of duty with the 26th Cavalry he became aide to Maj. Gen. Edward P. King, Jr., Artillery Officer of USAFFE. After the fall of Bataan he was confined first in Camp O'Donnell and later Cabanatuan. In July 1943, he was moved to a prison camp in Japan and to Manchuria in April 1945. In August of that year he was released by elements of the OSS at Mukden met General King and flew back to the United States with him. He is now on duty at Headquarters, Florida Military District, Jacksonville. The original of the diary is in Major Tisdelle's possession, and has been used with his permission.

²Dr. Morton is chief of the Pacific Section of the Historical Division, War Department Special Staff.



Major Tisdelle (right) speaking during interrogations by the Japanese. Shown with him are General King (extreme left) and Major Wade Cothran, senior aide, who died later in the sinking of a Japanese prison ship. (Reproduction of an enemy photograph published in the *Manila Sunday Tribune*, April 19, 1942.)

It has not been possible, because of limitations of space, to reproduce the diary in full. Rather than present excerpts or scattered entries, it was decided to reproduce only that section which is of the greatest interest and importance. The period from February 1st to April 13, 1942 was selected. This portion of the diary has been presented in its entirety. It includes a day by day account of the shelling and bombing of Corregidor as well as the progress of operations on Bataan. From Major Tisdelle's laconic entries, the reader gains a vivid picture of the effects of short rations and inadequate medical supplies on men in combat. For the period from 21 March, when General King assumed command of the Luzon Force, to the surrender of Bataan less than three weeks later, Major Tisdelle's diary records the successive steps in the Japanese offensive and the

rapid dissolution of American resistance from his vantage point as aide to the commanding general. The account of the surrender, the closing section of the diary, is a document of the first importance.

As the diary opens, at the beginning of February 1942, the Japanese are shelling Corregidor from Cavite and bombing it from the air. The scarcity of food and drugs has become critical, and the military situation serious enough to justify the withdrawal of President Quezon and other high officials to the south. On March 12th General MacArthur, with many of his staff, departed for Australia. He left as his deputy Brig. Gen. Lewis C. Beebe, with Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright commanding the Luzon Force. The War Department changed this situation almost immediately and created a new command, U. S. Forces in the Philip-

pires (USFIP), promoted General Wainwright to lieutenant general, and designated him as its commander. On March 21st he assumed command of USFIP, with General Beebe as his chief of staff. That same day General King was assigned to head the Luzon Force, consisting of all troops on Bataan, about 75,000 men:

During March the military situation on Bataan deteriorated rapidly. The American and Filipino soldiers were on one-third to one-half rations, had inadequate supplies and ammunition, were completely exhausted and lacked air support. On March 28th General Wainwright reported to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, that the enemy blockade was successfully preventing the movement of supplies to Bataan and Corregidor and that there was only enough food on Bataan to feed the troops there until April 15th on one-third rations, poorly balanced and deficient in vitamin content. To be frank, he added, unless more supplies were received for the men on Bataan by April 15th they would be starved into defeat. To this General MacArthur in Australia countered with a plan by which the Bataan forces could fight their way out of the peninsula and, perhaps, inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy.

Before any measures could be taken to carry out MacArthur's plan, the Japanese began an attack on April 3rd which, five days later, outflanked the American lines on Bataan and made further organized resistance impossible. (See map.) By April 7th the situation had become so serious that General King sent his chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Arnold J. Funk, to Corregidor to inform General Wainwright that he might have to surrender. Although Wainwright appreciated fully the desperate circumstances of the Bataan forces, his own orders from General MacArthur and President Roosevelt

precluded the possibility of surrender of any part of his command but called instead for an attack and he so directed.³

General King, following instructions, threw everything he had into the attack of the 8th. But the effort was useless. By late afternoon, the General realized that the military situation did not permit further effective resistance.⁴ All his reserves, and the reserves of the two corps under him, had been committed. One corps had completely disintegrated and no longer existed as a fighting unit. The enemy had a clear passage to the southern tip of the peninsula, and in his path lay the hospitals with their 12,000 defenseless patients. "All roads and trails . . ." reads General King's report, "were jammed with stragglers and refugees pursued by Japanese infantry columns and tanks, as well as constant bombing and strafing by low flying enemy bombers."⁵ It is doubtful that General King's force of 75,000 men (of whom 11,000 were Americans) could have resisted much longer even if the enemy had not launched his attack. Malnutrition, malaria, and intestinal disease had lowered combat efficiency by more than 75 percent during the final weeks of the campaign. Men were getting 1,000 calories a day in March and the Luzon Force Surgeon estimated that they required at least 3,500 calories to fight effectively in the jungles of Bataan. The ration was deficient in vitamins A, B, and C, and beriberi was almost universal. Malaria accounted for a very large number of casualties. By April 1st the malarial rate had reached 1,000 cases daily, and there was little hope of securing additional supplies of quinine.

³Gen. J. M. Wainwright, *General Wainwright's Story*, edited by Robert Considine (N. Y., 1946), p. 79.

⁴Interview, editor with General King, Feb. 12, 1947; with Col. J. V. Collier, G-3, Luzon Force, Nov. 20, 1946.

⁵Wainwright, Report of Operations of USAFFE and USFIP, 1941-1942, Annex VI: Report of Operations of Luzon Force, p. 7.

On the evening of April 8th General King called his staff together and discussed the situation with them. The crucial question he asked them was: would the Japanese be able to reach the high ground above Mariveles (which he regarded as the key to the defense of Bataan and Corregidor) as rapidly if he opposed them as they would if he did not. The consensus was that the enemy would reach Mariveles by the evening of the 9th in any event. With no relief in sight and with no possible chance to delay the enemy, General King decided to open negotiations for surrender. He made this decision fully understanding that the responsibility was entirely his own.⁶ He directed that all weapons and equipment, except motor vehicles and gasoline, be destroyed immediately. This order was carried out during the night of April 8-9 and was completed by 0600.⁷ He then sent Col. E. C. Williams, his chief of artillery, and Maj. Marshal H. Hurt, Jr., to the Japanese commander with the following instructions:

1. You will proceed at such time or hour as you deem necessary, and in time to arrive at our front line at daylight as an envoy of the Commanding General, Luzon Force, to the Commander of the Imperial Japanese Forces on Bataan.

2. You will be accompanied by Major Marshall H. Hurt, Jr., 31st Infantry. When received by the Commander of the Japanese forces you will present my compliments and request a designation of an hour and place where I may meet the Japanese commander and discuss terms for the cessation of hostilities.

3. If the Japanese commander should decide to receive me you will ask him the terms under which he will accept the surrender of the Luzon Force on Bataan.

4. In discussing terms, it is desired that you mention specifically and ask for consideration of the following:

- (a) The large number of sick and wounded in the two General hospitals, particularly Hos-

pital No. 1 which is dangerously close to the area wherein artillery projectiles may be expected to fall if hostilities continue.

- (b) The fact that our forces are somewhat disorganized and that it will be quite difficult to assemble them. This assembling and organizing of our own forces, necessary prior to their being delivered as prisoners of war, will necessarily take some time and can be accomplished by my own staff under my direction.

- (c) The physical condition of the command due to the long siege, during which they have been on short rations, which will make it very difficult to move them great distances on foot.

- (d) In order to assist in this matter, I have issued orders directing the non-destruction of motor transportation as far as practicable to permit the use of such transportation in assembling and delivering the personnel to such places as might be desired.

- (e) Request consideration for the vast number of civilians present at this time in Bataan, most of whom have simply drifted in and whom we have had to feed and care for. These people are in no way connected with the American and Filipino forces and their presence is simply incidental due to the circumstances under which the Bataan phase of hostilities was precipitated.⁸

Early in the morning of April 9th Colonel Williams and Major Hurt, moving by jeep and on foot, set out for the enemy lines. After some difficulty, they made contact with the Japanese commander in that sector. The Major was sent back for General King but Colonel Williams was kept as a hostage at Japanese headquarters.⁹ Several hours later General King, accompanied by Colonel James V. Collier, G-3 of the Luzon Force, and his aides, Majors Cothran and Tisdelle, left in two jeeps for the enemy lines, arriving about 0800. The story of what happened at the meeting between General King and General Homma's representative, Colonel Genpu Nakayama, is told in detail by Major Tisdelle. Nothing has been found which changes

⁶Interview with General King and Colonel Collier.

⁷Wainwright, Report of Operations, p. 6.

⁸Memo, Maj. Gen. E. P. King for Col. E. C. Williams, 9 Apr. 42, sub: Instructions for Colonel E. C. Williams.

⁹Extract Diary of Major Hurt.

the account in any way. It seems evident that the Japanese were insisting on knowing General Wainwright's connection with King's actions in order to avoid having to accept the piecemeal surrender of Wainwright's forces. They took the position that the Bataan force was not surrendered but was captured on the battlefield.¹⁰

No attempt was made to make the surrender a matter of record with a signed statement. Colonel Collier and Major Hurt, with a Japanese officer, were sent back to headquarters to pass on the news of the surrender.¹¹ General Funk in turn sent couriers to notify surviving units to cease fighting and lay down their arms. Unit commanders re-

organized the troops in preparation for the assumption of control by the Japanese.

The events of the next few days are described only briefly in the diary. The motor vehicles and gasoline—enough for the entire Bataan force—which General King had saved in order to provide transportation for the wounded, sick, and weary troops, were hardly used. Instead, the Japanese marched the majority of the captured soldiers from the southern tip of Bataan to San Fernando, about one hundred miles away, from where they were sent to prison camps at O'Donnell and Cabanatuan. The story of the horrors of the "Death March" is the epilogue to the battle for Bataan.

DIARY OF MAJOR A. C. TISDELLE

February 1942

*1st, Sunday.*¹²

We have rigged up 100-pound aerial bombs in bamboo tripods in beach areas concealed [camouflaged] to look like fish traps. Fuse set at "O." Since we have insufficient artillery we planned to explode these bombs by rifle fire from shore in the event of renewed Jap landings.

2nd, Monday.

Routine bombings front and rear areas. Our patrols are able to thrust forward beyond the lines 3 to 4 kms thru entire front and spot Nip troop concentrations. They are giving us information from the ground although bombing of our installations continued. Lieut. Grady, courier, took maps to Captain Steigler at Cabcaben, our beach defense officer. Maps to be used in connection with the coordination of fire from the

ground when the Nips attempt landing at Lamao-Cabcaben area. Everything has been against us since war started. We could coordinate fire from mortar batteries and Corregidor to much better advantage if the batteries had shrapnel rounds. The armor-piercing 12-inch shells are not very effective on light material and personnel.

3rd, Tuesday.

Routine bombing front and rear areas. Col Duckworth and Col Glattly¹³ are both very much concerned about the increase in malaria. Malaria is beginning to be so prevalent it is necessary that we secure adequate supplies of quinine.

4th, Wednesday.

Routine bombing front and rear. Bataan front inactive. Submarine came into Corregidor last night bringing some supplies. However, submarine cannot carry much.

¹⁰Interview with General King.

¹¹Interview with Colonel Collier.

¹²All times are East Longitude.

¹³Col. Harold W. Glattly, M. C., later became surgeon of the Luzon Force. Col. James W. Duckworth was commanding officer of General Hospital No. 1.

5th, Thursday.

Routine bombing front and rear areas. Major Warren Clear out in sub for Australia, but he had to leave most of his luggage including President Roosevelt's stone lions behind.¹⁴

6th, Friday.

Routine bombing front and rear areas. Some of our men show definite signs of intense nerve fatigue. Others are getting used to the constant bombing. We are gradually getting the Philippine Army personnel to lay flat on the ground instead of cowering under trees during bombing, and we are suffering fewer casualties. Saw Major Herrick over at General Pierce's¹⁵ headquarters. Telephoning General King, I got on the line by mistake while Major Herrick was speaking with one of his signal sergeants setting up a wire line on the west front while the infantry was cleaning a few Nips left over from the west coast landing and I could hear here small arms fire cracking over the telephone wire while Herrick's sergeant was on top of the telephone pole. Herrick asked the sergeant where he was and the sergeant replied: "For Christ's sake, Sir, I don't know. I am somewhere between 'asinine and quinine' points." Pretty good. He was somewhere between Anisasin [Anyasan] and Quinauan Points. Fort Drum, Hughes and Mills fired on by enemy artillery on Cavite.¹⁶ Hits on Corregidor and Fort Drum. No damage to Hughes and Mills by rapid fire from 140 [mm.] howitzers.

¹⁴Major Warren Clear. The reference to the stone lions is explained in the entry of January 14th. These lions had been given to Major Clear by Chiang Kai Shek for President Roosevelt, and weighed 25 pounds each.

¹⁵Brig. Gen. Clinton A. Pierce commanded the 26th Cavalry (PS) when the war broke out and at this time was in command of a separate force consisting of miscellaneous units.

¹⁶The four fortified islands in Manila Bay were Corregidor (Ft. Mills), El Fraile (Ft. Drum), Carabao (Ft. Frank), and Caballo (Ft. Hughes).

7th, Saturday.

Front inactive, routine bombing front and rear. Fire from Cavite on our forts continued. Men definitely showing signs of enervation and loss of weight.

8th, Sunday.

Routine bombing front and rear. Light patrol activity on the Bataan front. Fire from Cavite continues. Second month of war. Generals King and Moore sat under a fly at the west end of Malinta Hill [Corregidor] when Cavite opened up and let three freight trains move overhead landing on the Bataan side of the island. General King asked General Moore's opinion on the caliber. General Moore said, "I thought they were 140 howitzers." General King agreed. A short time later a Coast Artillery sergeant came up and announced that one had landed on the shore which was a dud and that the caliber was 240 mm. When this was reported General King said if he had known that he would have been twice as scared. The two generals had remained seated and continued smoking the whole time. General King, certainly, has a subtle sense of humor.

9th, Monday.

Routine bombing as usual. About 1000 hours our 4 P-40's returned from reconnaissance missions to land at Cabcaben Field. Almost at the same time they were jumped by a formation of nine enemy dive bombers from over the mountains. Five enemy dive bombers were seen to be shot down. However, only three P-40's returned. This reduces us to three airplanes when Tom Garrity was lost.¹⁷

10th, Tuesday.

Routine bombing. Report Don Isidro

¹⁷This is apparently an error. The P-40 pilot lost on February 10th was Lt. Earl R. Stone, Jr. Lt. Thomas Garrity was an intelligence officer on Wainwright's staff at this time. Allison Ind, *Bataan, The Judgment Seat* (N. Y., 1944), p. 293.

sunk on way to Corregidor from Cebu with much needed supplies. Hope that Don Esteban will be able to get thru.¹⁸

11th, Wednesday.

Routine bombing front and rear. Dull activity on front and sporadic reconnaissance. General King now has many fake artillery positions to lure the Nips. Since getting fake artillery positions on Bataan, Nip bombing has damaged very few of our artillery positions thus wasting their bombs on our false positions. False positions consist of moving our real artillery after they have blown out front cover, to new location up front and then setting dummy bamboo canons in old positions and firing some powder from the old position to induce the Nips to bomb it. This ruse has worked persistently. G-2 reports that enemy permitting US civilian internees to set up their own laundries at Santa Tomas in Manila.

12th, Thursday.

Routine bombing front and rear areas.

13th, Friday.

Routine bombing front and rear areas. Shell fire from Cavite on Harbor defenses.

14th, Saturday.

Routine bombing front and rear areas. Shell fire from Cavite and on harbor defenses.

15 Sunday.

Likewise. Shelling from Cavite on harbor defenses is increasing in intensity. Shelling continued steadily from 1600 hours to 1900 hours and again from 2000 hours to 2100 hours. We will probably be shelled constantly from now on from Cavite unless we are able to silence these guns. Checking artillery materiel strength today.

16th, Monday.

We have lost 13 SPM (self propelled

mounts, 75 mm guns); shows 13 lost in action and 9 destroyed to prevent capture, prior to getting into Bataan. I have noticed SPMs have three undesirable features: too high silhouette, insufficient protection in front, and rear idler sometimes throws track. These guns should be entirely mobile. However, experience shows that they must be properly dug in for protection. Otherwise an excellent piece of materiel. Routine bombing front and rear areas. Routine shelling from Cavite. Nip radio today claims cruiser *Houston* has been sunk Feb 4th with Admiral Hart aboard.¹⁹ The damned Nips have got a new propaganda program that does not help our morale any. The men joke happily but underneath they are disquieted. KZRH in Manila plays American songs to American soldiers on Bataan and Corregidor at 2145 hours every night. Theme song "Ships that never come in" followed by popular records. G-2 only able to get meager reports concerning enemy activity and troop concentration. Nips continue holding front lines loosely and with impunity knowing that unless we receive support we will not dare to extend our flanks by advancing.

18th, Wednesday.

Routine bombing front and rear. Now and then fire from Cavite. Lost the *Neptune*²⁰ today from shellfire near Fort Frank. If we lose any more small boats, the courier is going to have to swim back from Bataan to Corregidor. Surgeon General says our men are now 55% combat efficient from debilities

¹⁹The report is not true. Admiral Thomas C. Hart commanded the Asiatic Fleet and up to February 15th was in command of naval forces in General Wavell's ABDA command. The action of the *Houston* referred to here seems to be that of February 15-16 when she was escorting a convoy attacked by Japanese planes. The *Houston* was lost shortly after the Battle of Java Sea, in March 1942.

²⁰USHB *Neptune* was assigned to the harbor defense of Manila and Subic Bays and was used as auxiliary mine planter.

¹⁸USAT *Don Esteban* was a 1,000 ton cargo diesel driven motor ship.

due to malaria, dysentery and general malnutrition.

19th, Thursday.

Routine bombing front and rear, and shell fire from Cavite. Had a close call again today when a strafing came on me suddenly and I had just made a ditch.

20th, Friday.

Routine bombing front and rear. Shelling from Cavite. Heard Legaspi²¹ came in with supplies on the 18th from Cebu. Brought in some much needed quinine and foodstuffs. Cases of food piled on the docks look very big but won't scratch the surface for what we will need; and unless we can get command of the air and bring in an actual convoy we are lost.

21st, Saturday.

Routine bombing front and rear areas. Routine shelling of harbor defenses. President Quezon and his party and family sailed last night on the Legaspi for the south.²²

22nd, Sunday.

Routine bombing front and rear areas. Shelling from Cavite. G-2 suspects enemy troop concentration in vicinity of San Fernando. Our patrols are beginning to encounter more intense enemy counter patrol activities. Submarine came in after dark, with around 200 rounds of mechanical fuse 3-inch anti-aircraft ammunition, and maybe we can shoot down a few Nip bombers that would be flying over with impunity out of the range of our antiquated powder train fuse 3-inch anti-aircraft rounds. It's hell to have nothing to work with.

23rd, Monday.

Routine bombing front and rear. Shelling from Cavite. Enemy patrolling in front

more intensified. Stopped to see Captain Don Whitman, 24th FA at his battery position while returning from reconnaissance out in front. I had a real peanut butter sandwich. Don has one large jar of peanut butter he saves for special occasions. Got a slight strafing near Cabacben on way home. High Commissioner Sayre, Mrs. Sayre and some personnel left on submarine after dark for Australia. Heard President Roosevelt talk on what our production will be in 1943-44. The President means to cheer us up. Actually, his talk tends to weaken morale. We are not interested in what the production will be in 1943-44 and 45. All we want are two things, but we need them right now. Unless supplies arrive soon we will be finished by the latter part of March.

24th, Tuesday.

Routine bombing front and rear. Shelling from Cavite. Enemy patrol in front very much intensified. They are apparently building a strong line pivoted on Orani and a point 6 or 8 kilometers south of Olongapo.

25th, Wednesday.

Routine bombing front and rear. No shelling from Cavite. Apparently harbor defenses have made it very hot over in Cavite. If only we had air observation.

26th, Thursday.

Routine bombing front and rear. No shelling from Cavite. Nips are definitely moving guns around in Cavite. Enemy patrol activity intensified in front. Have pushed back some of our OPLRs²³ which, however, were later restored. Our one quarter PA [Philippine Army] type rations are telling on our men. When everyone goes down hill together appearances are not so noticeable.

27th, Friday.

Routine bombing front and rear. Front

²¹The *Legaspi* was a 1,000 ton motor ship used in the inter-island trade.

²²The party included Vice President Osmena, and stopped at Cebu, Panay, and Mindanao before leaving for Australia.

²³Outpost line of resistance. MLR is the main line of resistance. See map.



American soldiers on Bataan listen to news broadcasts during the last days of the fighting

quiet today. A blockade runner approximately 1500 tons came in to Corregidor today with a heavy load but carrying scant supplies for our forces.

28th, Saturday.

Routine bombing front and rear. Front as usual. Damn near got it again today while driving on road near KM 168. Bombers apparently aiming for Quartermaster dump. If the Nips ever invent a bomb that does not shriek a warning, well, in that case, I probably won't know the difference anyway. Saw Col Williams and Maj Pugh.²⁴ Nips very annoying. They were coordinating their firing from their small mortar in time with our artillery to try to give our infantry the impression that we are short-shooting.

²⁴Col. E. C. Williams was in the Artillery Section of USAFFE at this time, and Maj. John R. Pugh was aide to General Wainwright.

March 1942

1st, Sunday.

Routine bombing front and rear areas. No shelling from Cavite. Don Esteban was sunk yesterday off Mindoro while trying to bring in supplies.

2nd, Monday.

Routine bombing front and rear. Heard Don Isidro sunk two weeks ago today. This just about scuttles our chances for getting in supplies unless the US can give us control of the air.

3rd, Tuesday.

Routine bombing front and rear areas. Still no shelling from Cavite. Our combination—bomber-attack-pursuit—P-40 airforce was on a party for the Nips in Subi [Subic Bay] last night, each plane carrying a hundred pound bomb, plus smaller bombs. They got the Nips with their pants down and sank

two freighters and one tanker.²⁵ Observers on Mount Samat stated that it was a lovely show. Only two of the three P-40's returned. So, now we have two airplanes only. Nips are feeling out our front weakness and G-2 reports large concentrations around Guagua. Our PS [Philippine Scouts] are using baluga (negritos) for scouting purposes with success. General King's efforts to conciliate the little black pigmies have borne fruit. Reports show that their poisoned arrows and adroit ambushes are causing the Nips some concern.

4th, Wednesday.

Routine bombing front and rear. Nips on front are still using their damned fire crackers. For a while our troops showed some concern over these firecrackers because they sounded just like the Nip's .27 caliber rifle fire, *modus operandi*.²⁶ Nip firecrackers from mortar behind their lines are giving our troops the impression that there are Nip soldiers behind as well as in front. However, our men are now on to this ruse.

5th, Thursday.

Routine bombing front and rear. Desultory shelling from Cavite. Two American officers drove up today after dark thru Nip lines for some little distance in a jeep before they realized what they had done.^{26a} They turned around and came back as quietly as they could, driving slowly and attempting to appear nonchalant right by a group of Japanese soldiers, who sighting their car, came smartly to attention and saluted while the American officers passed through them at a moderate rate of speed, returning their salute and con-

tinuing on safely back to their own lines. I do not mention names in order to avoid embarrassment.

6th, Friday.

Routine bombing front and rear. Light harassing shelling on harbor defenses from Cavite. OP on Mount Samat spot group of enemy personnel across Tuol River apparently meeting for lunch. They numbered about 60. Dropped one 155 mm shell down amongst them. A beautiful shot with complete surprise.

7th, Saturday.

Routine bombing front and rear. No shelling. Nips brought truck convoy bumper to bumper toward the front. Col Quintard's^{26b} 155 mm artillery dropped first round at tail of the column and three other rounds right down the column. Beautiful shooting.

8th, Sunday.

Enemy patrol activity on front, showing greater activity in front of the 41st Division, II Corps.²⁷

9th, Monday.

Routine bombing front and rear. Shelling from Cavite increasing. Nips have got 77 mm howitzers²⁸ on barges in Manila Bay which came in and shelled the blazes out of the Cabcabena area in the evening. A good thing the pier at Cabcabena is a quay instead of a dock. Nips made use of fire from barges on the east coast to cover their landing at Agloma.

10th, Tuesday.

Routine bombing front and rear. Shelling from Cavite is distinct today. General Wainwright, Col Pugh and Tom Dooley came

²⁵This raid was prompted by a report that two large Japanese tankers and three freighters were entering Subic Bay. For a report of the action, see Ind, *Bataan, The Judgment Seat*, pp. 305-323, and Lt. Col. William E. Dyess, *The Dyess Story* (N. Y., 1944), pp. 51-60. Colonel Dyess participated in the raid.

²⁶The Japanese had no such weapon. Major Tisdelle's reference is to the .25 caliber rifle in use at this time.

^{26a}At this time the command car was called a "jeep," and today's "jeep" was called the "peep."

^{26b}Col. Alexander Quintard, CO, 301st FA.

²⁷See map. The 41st Division (PA) held a position on the left flank of the II Corps line, in front of Mt. Samat. Later, the Japanese began their final offensive in this sector.

²⁸The Japanese had no such weapon. There is a 70-mm. howitzer and a 76.2-mm. (3-inch) dual purpose gun (Navy).

over today to see General MacArthur.²⁹ Our P-40's are reported to have joined an enemy formation and reconnoitered as far as Clark Field with them without their knowing it. Enemy infantry on front of II Corps is now patrolling day and night.

11th, Wednesday.

Routine bombing front and rear. Little shelling from Cavite. Col Williams came over from Advance CP on Bataan tonight.

12th, Thursday.

Routine bombing front and rear. Shelling from Cavite. Certain high-ranking military personnel off for the south in PT boats.³⁰ Hope they will be able to get help.

13th, Friday.

Bombing front and rear and shelling from Cavite. Japanese batteries fire suddenly 1, 2, 3, 4, almost simultaneously. Now that we are getting a great deal of counterbattery fire our scarcity of wire which precludes the use of the best OPs higher and forward is a serious disadvantage. Today PT boats carrying certain military personnel arrived safely at Mindanao.³¹

14th, Saturday.

Routine bombing and shelling. Scarcity of gasoline is seriously hampering our efforts. Doctors say that our combat efficiency is a little below 45%. Both general hospitals are so overcrowded that only serious cases are being sent there. All of the lesser cases are kept in Division areas.

15th, Sunday.

The effectiveness of our harbor defense

forts is beginning to slacken. Nip artillery is giving Fort Frank and Drum a heavy shellacking daily. Enemy activity on the front of II Corps is now being extended to the right flank of the I Corps. Believe that their offensive will be on the front of II Corps, in the least rugged terrain, when it comes. The 26th Cavalry and other units have finished the last of the horses. This is just about the last of our meat. Enemy activity and trigger-happy beach guards make it impossible for our fishermen to catch enough fish in Manila Bay and the China Sea to help out to any extent. Monkeys and iguanas are quite scarce and about all we have is rice. We stopped daily prophylaxis doses of two tablets of quinine per man, per day, on the 1st of January, to conserve supplies for more serious cases. Now we have so many serious cases of malaria that their supplies permits treatments of only the most serious. Our quarter ration has reduced our stamina to such an extent that men are being incapacitated by minor sickness they would ordinarily be able to throw off without medication.

16th, Monday.

Routine bombing and shelling. A new command is constituted today, called the Luzon Force, comprising all troops in Bataan excepting navy at Mariveles and the air corps being held in reserve for planes which might come. General Wainwright assumes command with General MacArthur continuing in overall command of all forces in the Philippines and in the south. Use of PS scouts and Baluga negrito scouts is made in determining location of enemy artillery. Our counterbattery continues remarkably effective. General King, Major Cothran³² and I had seen Nip columns enroute on the trail between the front line and General Blue-

²⁹Lt. Col. John R. Pugh and Capt. Thomas Dooley were aides to General Wainwright. The conversation between Generals MacArthur and Wainwright is described in the latter's book, *General Wainwright's Story*, pp. 1-5.

³⁰The reference here is to General MacArthur's departure for Australia.

³¹Reference to MacArthur's arrival in Mindanao. From here he flew to Australia by plane.

³²Maj. Wade C. Cothran, senior aide to General King.

mel's³³ headquarters when we came under some enemy shelling. However we were able to retreat. The Nips now have an observation balloon just out of range of our 155's.

17th, Tuesday.

Routine bombing and shelling front and rear areas. Japanese bombing increasing in intensity in front of 2 regiments of the II Corps. Reported patrolling front pushed in our OPLR in places. Later restored with great difficulty. My 32nd birthday.

18th, Wednesday.

Routine bombing and shelling. Bombing on front continues severe. Radio KGEI San Francisco announces General MacArthur arrived safely in Australia and assumed command of Far East Forces. General Clinty Pierce in hospital with pneumonia but doing fine with plenty of spirit as well. Nips reported concentrating large reinforcement behind I Corps, of around 20,000 men.

19th, Thursday.

Routine shelling and bombing. Bombing along front of II Corps most intense to date. KGEI announces MacArthur commander in chief of United Nations land, sea and air forces.

20th, Friday.

General Wainwright promoted to Lieutenant General. Routine bombing and shelling.

21st, Saturday.

Major General E. P. King assumes command of Luzon Force and Lieutenant General Wainwright of the Philippines. Wainwright and his staff move over to Corregidor. Brigadier General Arnold Funk, one of the finest officers I have ever encountered will be General King's chief of staff. Col Floyd Marshall is G-1; Col Holland is G-2; Col Victor Collier, G-3; and Col Hilton is G-4. Col C. E. Lawrence is Force's Quartermas-

ter.³⁴ Cols Lawrence and Collier are remarkably efficient officers. Unfortunately Col Lawrence has nothing to work with. General King, Cothran and I to II Corps, passed General Parker in dust of road, saw Col Steel. Then via 803d Engineer Trans-Bataan Skyway.³⁵ We were stopped by a huge tree across road three quarters of the way to I Corps. No way to move tree. Came under 75 mm shellfire returning to the east road on our return to GHQ. Took cover, not hit. General King appoints Col C. E. Williams his force artillery officer. Col Williams knows more about artillery than appears in most of the manuals and has done a remarkable job together with Cols Corkill³⁶ and Ralph Hirsh of the artillery staff. Our artillery had to do the job of the air corps besides artillery and its support of the infantry was chiefly made it possible for us to resist, though cut off from outside help for so long. Maj Gen A. M. Jones, commanding I Corps,

³⁴The Luzon Force Staff consisted of the following:

Commanding General—Major General E. P. King, Jr., AUS; Chief of Staff—Brigadier General Arnold J. Funk, GSC, AUS; G-1—Colonel Floyd Marshall, GSC (Inf); G-2—Lieutenant Colonel Frank L. Holland, GSC (Inf); G-3—Colonel James V. Collier, GSC (FA); G-4—Colonel Roy C. Hilton, GSC (Inf); Artillery—Colonel Everett C. Williams, FA; Quartermaster—Colonel Charles S. Lawrence, QMC; Traffic Control—Colonel Richard G. Rogers, QMC; Transportation—Colonel Michael Quinn, QMC; Ordnance—Colonel George W. Hirsch, OD;* Engineer—Colonel Henry H. Stickney, CE;* Signal—Colonel Joshua A. Stansell, SC; Inspector General—Colonel Gilmer M. Bell, IGD; Surgeon—Colonel Harold W. Glatly, MC; Adjutant General—Lieutenant Colonel Earl T. Halstead, AGD; Chemical—Colonel Stuart A. Hamilton, CWS;* Air—Colonel Lawrence S. Churchill, AC; Chaplain—Lieutenant Colonel Alfred C. Oliver, CH.

*Indicates officer functioned in a dual capacity, being also a staff officer assigned to USFIP.

³⁵Maj. Gen. George M. Parker, Jr., commanded II Corps. Col. Charles Steel was C. of S., II Corps. Maj. Gen. A. M. Jones commanded I Corps.

The Trans-Bataan Skyway was a single-lane highway with by-passes, built by the 803d Engineers to replace the old trans-Bataan road from Pilar to Bagac when part of that road was seized by the enemy. It stretched from Lamao on the east coast to a point on the west coast near I Corps headquarters.

³⁶Col. William E. Corkill, FA.

³³Brig. Gen. Clifford Bluemel commanded the 31st Division (PA).

called on General King on our return for conference. General King has a great deal of respect for General Jones' ability with reason. He has done a remarkable job all the way from southern Luzon to Bataan, and since. Outside of General Pierce, he is at once the coolest and toughest officer I know. Our setbacks and disappointments never seem to bother him.

22nd, Sunday.

Heavy bombings in front and rear areas all day increase in intensity in rear areas. Road through mountain erased and so engineers engaged in putting our fake headquarters there back together again for the Nips to bomb. General King has some wrecked cars, etc. moved around to different positions ever few days so that the Japanese aerial photographs will show activity. So far they had dropped a lot of our pre-war scrap iron on General King's dummy installations and have not bothered us at our real installations in the jungle at all.

23rd, Monday.

Enemy activity on the front this time. A Filipino colonel came in today and gave General King a carabao hind quarter for him and his staff. General King sent it down to the general headquarters mess. I felt a little unhappy but I understand how General King feels on the score of special mess at a time like this when we are all starving.

24th, Tuesday.

Front and rear areas no change. General King, Col Corkill and Maj Cothran and I go on inspection of II Corps echelon including regimental headquarters today. Bombings of Corregidor resumed with greater intensity. Big bombers over harbor defenses all day and at all hours.

25th, Wednesday.

Front and rear no change. However, dive bombings front lines of II Corps, particularly on right flank, intensified. Approximately

50 bombers gave our rear areas a thorough shellacking at sunset. Col. Sage's 200 CA (AA)³⁷ had a few magnetic fuses, 3-inch rounds that could reach the bombers and shot down three over Bataan.

26th, Thursday.

OPLR pushed in again in front of II Corps (restored) later today. Intensified bombing in front of II Corps continues. Philippine Army outpost retired to MLR abandoning rifles. Men up in front have been under daily bombing for four months without rest. We have no rest areas. I wonder how they stand it.

27th, Friday.

Front and rear no change. Reconnaissance planes overhead all day. Bombing continues intense. Col Lawrence found parts of bomb exploded near Km post 169 which was filled with scrap metal including watches, one thoroughly intact and marked "La Estrella del Norte" [a jewelry store in Manila] inside the back cover. This proves our G-2's opinion that the Nips are making picric acid bombs in Manila. General Wainwright came over to Bataan today for staff meeting with General King, General Jones, and General Parker of I and II Corps. General Lim, General Pierce, General Stevens, General Bluemel, General Capinpin, General Brougher, General Weaver, Generals McBride, De Jesus and Francisco, and General Funk at-

³⁷Col. Charles G. Sage commanded the 200th Coast Artillery (AA) until he assumed command of the Philippine Provisional Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) on 7 April 1942.

³⁸Brig. Gen. Vincente Lim, 41st Div. (PA).

Brig. Gen. Clinton A. Pierce, see note 15

Brig. Gen. Luther Stevens, 91st Div. (PA).

Brig. Gen. Clifford Bluemel, 31st Div. (PA).

Brig. Gen. Mateo Capinpin, 21st Div. (PA).

Brig. Gen. William E. Brougher, 11th Div. (PA).

Brig. Gen. Allen C. McBride, Hq. Philippine Dept. which functioned as a Service Command.

Brig. Gen. G. B. Francisco (PA), Philippine Constabulary.

Brig. Gen. Arnold J. Funk, C of S, Luzon Force.

Brig. Gen. Simon De Jesus, Intelligence Officer, Philippine Army.

tended the meeting.³⁸ Meeting is held for the purpose of coordinating action for the impending Japanese offensive which we believe will be brought against the front of II Corps.

*29th, Sunday.*³⁹

The sky is filled with enemy dive bombers and pursuit aircraft, front and rear areas. Received first note from Capt Barbour who went through Nip lines with some PS scouts to reconnoiter. Says Japanese are reported to have a concentration of approximately 60,000 men supported by tanks and artillery gathering in front of II Corps. Night bombing raids initiated on our front.

30th, Monday.

Enemy bombing exceptionally active. Bombed hospital No. 1 today, reported killing 7 and wounding 11. Attack in force in front of 42nd Inf,⁴⁰ consisting of about one regiment, repulsed tonight. OPLRs not restored. Some quinine came in today by submarine, sufficient for one week's dose for the most serious cases.

31st, Tuesday.

Terrific bombing all day. Food situation critical. Malaria cannot be controlled. Front of 42nd Inf evacuated. OPLR pushed back not restored. General King and I to II Corps in morning. Return at one PM.

April 1942

1st, Wednesday.

General King, Major Cothran and I went to subsectors C and D, saw General Bluemel and General Lough.⁴¹ Returned three PM.

³⁸There is no entry for Saturday, March 28, 1942.

³⁹42d Infantry was an element of the 41st Division (PA), which included also the 41st and 43d Infantry and the 41st FA. The 41st Division was on the left flank of II Corps.

⁴¹Subsector D included the 41st and 21st Division (PA) and Subsector C the 51st Combat Team and the 32d Infantry (PA). General Bluemel commanded the 31st Division (PA), and Brig. Gen. Maxim M. Lough the Philippine Division.

Earthquake of some intensity, approximately 20 seconds at 2212 PM. Another submarine came in with 400,000 tablets of quinine. Looks like big push is on. A Philippine Army NCO and two negritoes came in with a message from Major Thorpe, 26th Cav, operating behind the Nip lines. Also reports at least 60,000 reinforcements coming in on front of II Corps. MLR pushed back slightly on the front of 42d and 43d Inf Regiments. Heavy bombing continuing.

2nd, Thursday.

Front and rear no change. Very heavy bombing, much fighting on roads in front. Nip artillery is raising hell. If we could only get that damned balloon. More medical supplies came in by plane tonight. Have only enough rations for 19 days.

3rd, Friday.

Front and rear no change. Bombing heavy. Sky black with planes. Estimate an enemy division attacking in front of 42d Inf which fell back and gradually disintegrated. General King has released the 31st Inf, US and attached it to II Corps.⁴² 14th and 803d Engineers of GHQ to reserve area. Good Friday.

4th, Saturday.

Holy Saturday. Situation same. 31st Inf not yet committed by II Corps, 57th Inf PS moving from I to support II Corps. Front of Subsector D pushed back to original reserve line. Estimate 120 pieces of solid Nip artillery in front of II Corps. 75 mm artillery on barges in Manila Bay softening our right flank from the water.⁴³ General Wainwright and Tom Dooley conferred with General King today at II Corps headquarters,

⁴²The 31st Infantry (US), the only white infantry unit in the Philippines was in Luzon Force Reserve up to this time. The 57th Infantry (PS) was also in Luzon Force Reserve when the major attack began.

⁴³On 3 April the Japanese began the heaviest artillery attack of the entire campaign, directed principally against the 41st Division front.

1700 hours. Lines are completely broken in front of Sector D. Some enemy on Mount Samat. If we lose our OP on Mt. Samat we are finished.

5th, Sunday.

No change.

6th, Monday.

Situation no change. Troops in Subsector D have completely disintegrated. II Corps lines withdrawn in order to reform.

7th, Tuesday.

Situation the same. Another bad penetration in front of II Corps. Subsector C just falling back in center. Two of our divisions are demoralized.⁴⁴ Many captured. Hospital No. 1 has been hit again by heavy bombers. 50-60 have been killed and many wounded. General Parker has moved his headquarters back to GHQ. II Corps, along its entire front, is beginning to disintegrate. There has been no pressure in front of I Corps. However, General Jones is having to retire his right flank in order to maintain limiting points with the II Corps left. It is becoming increasingly difficult to reorganize troops to offer resistance. Men are abandoning arms and running out of ranks.

8th, Wednesday.

The army cannot attack. It is impossible. Area is congested with stragglers. I tried to go up the east road and was unable to drive because of the overturned trucks and struggling men, moving to the rear areas. With observation from balloons and from Mount Samat, the Nips are beginning to drop shells into the hospital area. General King has ordered all tanks, ammunition, and arms destroyed, and is going forward to contact the Japanese and try to avert a massacre. The main ammunition dump is 800 yards from GHQ. It is blowing up and showering GHQ with shell casings. I have never heard

such terrific explosions before. Our CP is being rained with shell fragments and shells splash in the air. There were 2 earthquakes tonight and in the morning our overhead cover was gone and there are empty shell cases all over the camp. It is miraculous we came through this.

9th, Thursday.

Col Williams and Major Hurt raised a white flag through the line at Lamao, this morning and arranged a conference with the Jap CG, a Lieutenant General Homma.⁴⁵ Later, General King, Major Cothran, and I went forward thru the lines with Col Collier and Major Hurt. Col Williams was kept by the Japs as a hostage. We traveled in two jeeps, and three fleets of dive bombers overhead bombed and strafed us all the way, repeatedly. We left at day break and met the first Japanese on our side of the bridge at Lamao. Everytime we were strafed, we stopped the car in the center of the road and flattened ourselves into the ditches and when the planes were almost overhead, Col Collier in first jeep, and I in the General's jeep ran out of the ditch and waved the white flags hoping the Japs would see them. If they did, they paid no attention. I made these white flags out of my bed sheet.

When we reached the bridge at Lamao, we were conducted to the major general commanding the division, at his headquarters in Rodriguez Park, and saw Colonel Williams waiting there. The division commander explained to us thru a very poor interpreter that he was not empowered to deal with General King and that we must wait for the arrival of some one from General Homma's headquarters. We arrived around 0800 hours and Col Nakayama and a captain, aide, arrived at 1100 hours and sat down at the table

⁴⁴Actually, no meeting was arranged with Lt. Gen. Mashura Homma who commanded all Japanese forces in the Philippines.

⁴⁵Probably the 41st and 21st Division (PA).



General King being interrogated by the Japanese shortly after the surrender. Left to right, Colonel E. C. Williams, Artillery Officer of the Luzon Force, General King, Major Cothran and Major Tisdelle. Two Japanese interrogators are in the foreground. (Reproduction of an enemy photograph published in the *Manila Tribune*, April 24, 1942.)

which had been brought outside for the interview. As they approached us, General King rose from his chair. The Jap colonel ignored him and sat down stiffly at the end of the table. General King resumed his seat across the table, sitting erect with his hands folded in front of him. I never saw him look more like a soldier than in this hour of defeat. The aide stood at one end of the table and I stood at the other end. The aide—interpreter—turned to General King and said:

"You are General Wainwright?" the interpreter snapped speaking English with a harsh Prussian accent.

General King replied that he was General King, commander of the Luzon Force.

"Where is General Wainwright?" the Jap demanded.

General King ignored this and said, "I've come to ask for terms for the troops in Bataan."

"We want to see General Wainwright. You must go and bring General Wainwright," said the aide.

General King reiterated he did not represent General Wainwright but only himself and the troops on Bataan. After this unexpected development the colonel, representing General Homma, and the aide held an excited colloquy, after which the interpreter asked, "For what purpose have you come?"

General King explained slowly and distinctly that he came to ask for an armistice of twelve hours during which time the Japs would remain in their present position while couriers notified forward elements of our surrender. General King also explained with great emphasis that we had preserved sufficient trucks and passenger transportation to move the prisoners to any place of internment that the Japs should name. There was more conferring in Japanese and then the interpreter turned back to General King and said the surrender must be unconditional. Ignoring the statement, General King repeated his request for the arrangement of the armistice and the use of the trucks for the movement of the troops. The Jap colonel

gave some instruction to the interpreter who repeated the surrender must be unconditional. General King then asked how the prisoners would be treated. Following another conference in Japanese, the interpreter turned back and said, "You must surrender unconditionally."

General King then asked, "Will you treat the prisoners well?"

The interpreter conferred again with the colonel representing General Homma and turned back again to General King and blurted incisively, "After all, we are not barbarians." And this was the most General King was able to secure in the way of a promise from the Japanese. He then agreed to surrender. The aide turned angrily to General King and said, "Your saber."

General King did not have a saber because when we took the field in Bataan I had left it in Manila. The general reiterated that he did not have a saber. This outrageous violation of ethics of surrender angered the interpreter and it looked for a short time as though the Japanese might break off the negotiations. However, they agreed to accept the General's pistol and after the other American staff officers and I laid down our pistols, we were taken captives.⁴⁶

We were taken to Balanga and there, outside the school house where General Homma's headquarters was located, General King and the rest of us were questioned by other staff officers through the same interpreter. We were questioned concerning the troops and materials on Bataan and then of the number of Japanese prisoners we had. We answered these questions truthfully and told the Japanese that there are 70,000 troops on Bataan. They were much disgruntled when they learned there were no tanks, artillery nor ammunition to be taken as war booty

and angrily demanded why there was none. General King, coolly but politely, told them that he had ordered all materiel except trucks and gasoline destroyed. The Japanese blew up but did not strike the general as I expected them to do. Following our questioning about Bataan we were questioned concerning Corregidor defenses. As before, they questioned General King first and the general gave the rest of us his cue by refusing to discuss Corregidor at all. His words were "It is not possible for me to give you any information concerning Corregidor. I can only answer questions about Bataan." At this time the Japanese did not try to force us to testify concerning Corregidor. We were taken from Balanga to Orani, and there placed in a room over a store overlooking the road and the military police headquarters across the way. We were questioned here and all questioned jointly and separately at different hours of the day and during the night for the next two days.

12th, Sunday.

On the morning of the 12th, the General and General Jones were taken by automobile to Camp O'Donnell. During the two days General King was at Orani, General Jones, General Brougher, General Lim, and General Capinpin together with other staff officers, were separated from the prisoner marchers as they passed by underneath our windows and brought upstairs to the room which we occupied. Then, on the morning of the 12th, General Jones and General King were taken by automobile to Camp O'Donnell. The next day, those remaining were questioned anew. That afternoon, I was forced to stand at attention for three hours and was slapped repeatedly for alleged impudence in refusing to discuss the defenses of Corregidor. On the 13th, the other officers and I were moved from the building and we joined the prisoners. We were marched to

⁴⁶For the next three days, Major Tisdelle consolidated all the events into one undated paragraph.



Colonel Ives surrenders to the Japanese at the foot of Mount Mariveles. (Reproduction of a Japanese photograph published in Japan.)

San Fernando and there loaded 150 men to each sugar box car, so crowded we were unable to sit down and most of the men have dysentery. The doors of the boxcar were closed and in the stifling heat of the day were taken from San Fernando to Capas and there marched to Camp O'Donnell.

Song of Bataan⁴⁷

We are the battling bastards of Bataan
No mammy, no pappy, no uncle Sam

No brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces
No airplanes, chow, or artillery pieces.

Variation

We are MacArthur's bastards
A fighting in Bataan
With neither father nor mother
Nor their old Uncle Sam.

⁴⁷This verse is supposed to have been written by Frank Hewlitt, United Press. There are many more stanzas which the diarist did not include.

REVOLUTION IN NETS

An Unglamorous But Essential Phase of Naval Warfare

BY BUFORD ROWLAND*

Nets and booms are among the most unglamorous of the major items in the arsenal of naval ordnance. The defensive job they perform in their eternal vigil to make secure our ships and harbors is unspectacular. No sensational "kills" are attributed to them.¹ Yet their mere presence acts to frustrate the most powerful submarine and its deadly torpedo. The reluctance on the part of large submarines to attempt to breach net and boom defenses has led to the employment of new forms of attack—the midget sub, one- and two-man torpedoes, which on the whole have proved as ineffective as their larger counterparts. The success of the defense against these spectacular weapons is the story of a late start and a whirlwind finish; of new methods of defense to counter new means of attack; and above all of resourcefulness in meeting the accelerated demands of a global and an amphibious war.

Defenses designed to close harbors to the penetration of enemy weapons can be traced to earliest time. While the employment of such defenses in American naval history dates back to Revolutionary days, it was not until World War I when the effectiveness of

the modern submarine was established that the use of such obstructions assumed any relative importance. To meet the menace of this new weapon, the anti-submarine net developed by the British shortly before the outbreak of the First World War was adopted by the U. S. Navy and installations were made at the principal Atlantic ports. Judged by present-day standards, this net was indeed crude but it furnished the security it was designed to give. Enemy records, examined after the war, revealed that the Germans made no attempt to penetrate the net defenses of American harbors.

The period following World War I witnessed a rapid decline of net activity in the U. S. Navy. No research or procurement was initiated and with the exception of the occasional netting of a harbor, primarily for training purposes, virtually no interest was shown in this type of defense. In 1939 when Hitler launched his European onslaught, there was no American experience with modern nets which could be drawn upon as a basis for design. The anti-submarine nets of World War I, valued at some \$5,000,000 and in storage at various activities along the Atlantic Coast, were in excellent condition but as obsolete for modern war as the old smooth bore cannon. Once again it was necessary to turn to the British.

The British Navy was outstanding in the development of nets and booms. From 1914 to 1918 it laid approximately 600 miles of nets in 85 harbors and bases. Engaged in rigging and maintaining these defenses were 360 officers, 4,222 men and 312 vessels. The

*During the recent war Mr. Rowland was commissioned in the Naval Reserve and served as Administrative Historical Officer and Assistant to the Chief of the History Section of the bureau of Naval Ordnance. Although references are not indicated in his study on nets, only official naval sources were utilized in its preparation. Mr. Rowland is presently engaged as an archivist in the Legislative Reference and Records Office, National Archives.

¹The official score of damage to the enemy naval effort is still in a classified status, figures for which have not been released for publication by the Navy Department.

British net, rushed into production without the usual consideration and service tests necessary to establish reliability, served its purpose although the one attack launched against it by a German submarine in October 1918 suggested that the security it afforded was largely illusory. This realization spurred the British to increased activity. During the years following the war, exhaustive experimental work was initiated and designs of promise were subjected to full scale service trials. By 1939 effective types had been developed and were in production. In the summer of 1939 the results of these years of research and experiment were offered to the U. S. Navy. The offer was accepted with alacrity and the officers dispatched to make a detailed study of the British net establishment returned in late 1939 with all available publications and drawings.

It is interesting to note that under British terminology "boom" describes any obstruction whose primary function is the exclusion of hostile vessels or weapons moving on or under the water. American practice distinguishes between the types of defense; nets defeat underwater moving objects, while booms counter surface threats.

PREPARATION FOR HARBOR DEFENSE, 1940-1941

The inadequacy of the World War I nets and booms to afford security for American harbors was well known to the Navy but it was not until the fiscal year 1940, with the general increase in appropriations, that a large-scale program could be undertaken. The original program called for the netting of ten harbors: Coco Solo, Canal Zone; Balboa, Canal Zone; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; St. Thomas, Virgin Islands; Hampton Roads, Virginia; Yorktown, Virginia; San Juan, Puerto Rico; Newport, Rhode Island; Rich Pass, Washington; and Agate Pass, Washington. The Chief of the Bureau of Ord-

nance estimated that it would require at least two years and possibly three to procure the material and install the defenses. The tempo of the European war soon led to the expansion of this program, and early in 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations directed procurement of material for defenses at Indian Island, San Francisco, San Pedro, San Diego, Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Kaneohe, Midway Island, New York, New London, Boston, Portsmouth, Casco Bay, Charleston, Argentina, Delaware Bay, and Pago Pago.

In carrying out the 1940-1941 net and boom project, considerable design work had to be done. During the initial stages, ordnance engineers, though leaning heavily on the British designs, found it necessary to make many modifications in the drawings in order to meet American production practices and standards. The British "tailored" their heavy nets to the site with extreme care, and this practice was adopted for the continental defenses and for a few outlying sites. Due to lack of experience with nets and booms the defenses in most instances had to be drastically modified at the time of installation in order to overcome conditions of current, sea, and anchor holding bottom. The problem was solved by the adoption of designs which showed the typical characteristics of the defense, and thus could be applied to any harbor with only minor modifications. The officer supervising the installation had the prerogative of using the materials in a manner which would furnish the most effective defense. This policy became more significant as the war progressed, since it was demonstrated very early that it was impossible to design from a remote location the optimum installation for a given site.

Difficulty was encountered in the design of shackles, clips, clamps, wire rope fittings, and clevises. Many of these marine hardware items had never been produced by American industry, and considerable time was required



Connecting nets to buoys on board the *Zebra* in Ulithi harbor, October 17, 1944.

in detailing the drawings of these components so that the material could be produced rapidly and at a reasonable cost. Cooperating with the Bureau of Ordnance in this work was the Hubbard Company of Pittsburgh, a well-established pole-line hardware firm, which under a dollar a year experimental contract developed many new items. In addition to its important design work, this company furnished over 90 per cent of the marine hardware required by the net program.

Late in 1940 British designs had been adapted for submarine nets, single and double-line torpedo nets, combined submarine and torpedo nets, light indicator net, boat indicator net, gates, and anti-motor boat booms for use in conjunction with sub-

marine or torpedo nets.

Production problems equalled those of the drawing boards. Manufacturers were unwilling to swap well-established civilian production with its known profits for the Pandora's Box of the defense program. In some instances nation-wide published schedules failed to bring a single bid.

The task was further complicated by the decision to use the facilities of small business as much as possible in order to leave the larger industrial establishments for the production of more urgent ordnance material. Many of the small firms indicating an interest in net work had such limited resources that there was little chance that they could successfully execute a Navy contract. Collectively their potentialities were great. At the

instigation of the Bureau of Ordnance the facilities of many of these plants were pooled and successful contractual relationships initiated. The Texhoma Company furnishes an excellent example of this type of cooperation. Composed of 26 small oil well tool machine shops scattered over northern Texas and southern Oklahoma, this company did an excellent job in producing over 50,000 flotation units.

Small business could not qualify for the manufacture of wire rope and the tremendous requirements for this item were supplied by two well established firms—the John A. Roebling's Sons Company of Trenton, New Jersey, and the American Chain and Cable Company, Incorporated, New York City.

Chain constituted an early production bottleneck. At the end of World War I the surplus of heavy chains of all sizes was sufficient to meet all peacetime requirements for many years. As a result artisans in heavy chain manufacture were forced to shift over into the specialty chain field and, of course, there was no further need to train apprentices. By 1939 the heavy chain industry was virtually dormant and could supply only a very small fraction of the chain required for the underwater defenses. Since the success of the whole net program depended upon an adequate supply of chain, it was imperative that apprentices be recruited immediately for training. While the nets were still on the drawing boards, the chain industry launched an ambitious recruiting campaign for trainees in the hope that there would be no appreciable time lag between design and production.

The training of chain makers was no routine process; special physical and mental qualifications were required, and in spite of the careful screening of applicants, only two out of ten likely prospects successfully completed the training program. Then, too, training was relatively slow since the apprentice had to work up through the various

sizes of chain from $\frac{3}{4}$ " to 1" and $1\frac{1}{4}$ " to 2". In spite of these handicaps, which caused a slight delay in meeting early schedules, the chain industry by 1941 had built up its capacity and was fulfilling all production requirements. In the revival of the industry the McKay Company of Pittsburgh played a leading role. This company had no heavy chain capacity in 1939 but under the direction of Mr. Frank A. Bond, its executive vice-president and president of the Chain Institute of America, it had within two years built the largest wrought iron chain making plant in the world at McKees Rocks, Pennsylvania, and was producing more heavy chain than all other American manufacturers combined.

The greatest potential threat to the accomplishment of the original net program came from an unexpected competition between the Bureau of Ordnance and the Bureau of Ships acting in its early capacity as the Navy purchaser of Lend-Lease material. An agreement was reached whereby the Bureau of Ordnance took the McKay Company, the largest chain manufacturer, and left the remaining producers to the Bureau of Ships. This was indeed a fortunate solution. With a little pressure from the Bureau of Ordnance and a long range program guaranteed, the McKay Company proceeded to expand its already increased facilities and by the end of 1941 was producing about twice as much chain as all other manufacturers. This supply exceeded the scheduled requirements and the continuity was never interrupted.

In spite of the tremendous expansion of net facilities, manufacturers were barely able to keep abreast of requirements. Material for twenty-eight harbors, however, was produced and delivered in less time than set for the original ten; 1,050 drawings, 55 overlays, 45 sketches and 120 lists of drawings were required for the 150,000 tons of material that went into these defenses. With the delivery

of the new type nets the old World War I antisubmarine net material was broken out for use in fixed obstructions.

The amount of net material provided for the twenty-eight harbor installations is summarized in the following table:

Type	Length (miles)	Estimated Price		Total
		Per Mile		
S Double Line (Submarine Net) ———	0.45	\$600,000	\$	270,000
B Single Line ———	12.60	320,000		4,032,000
Above Converted to SB (Submarine Net and Mo- torboat Boom) ———		80,000		1,008,000
SB Double Line ———	9.3	700,000		6,610,000
TB Double Line (Torpedo Net and Mo- torboat Boom) ———	2.1	600,000		1,260,000
I Double (Heavy Indicator Net) —	11.62	500,000		5,810,000
I Single Line ———	7.62	270,000		1,944,000
LI Two Panel Deep (Light Indicator Net) —	4.57	27,000		123,390
TOTAL ———	47.93		\$	21,057,390

The installation of the defenses was accomplished without serious complication, all material with the exception of a few minor alterations and additions being delivered by December 1, 1941. Before any of the nets were placed, officers trained for several months in the theoretical and practical aspects of net defenses were available in the various districts.² Net vessels were being built and some net components were undelivered at the time, but the ingenuity and training of the officers and enlisted men resulted in adequate net defenses although

many, of necessity, deviated from the standard designs.

It is significant that the efficient organization of the productive capacity during 1940-1941 contributed immeasurably to the smooth functioning of the net and boom production program in the years following Pearl Harbor. In the large, production problems had been solved by the time of Pearl Harbor.

LESSONS OF PEARL HARBOR

The experience gained at Pearl Harbor had the effect of reorientating the whole net and boom program. The devastation caused by the Japanese aerial torpedoes and the potential threat of the midget submarine pointed up clearly the weaknesses of the existing net defenses.

On December 7, 1941, 86 combat and service ships were berthed in Pearl Harbor; eight of the nine battleships of the Pacific Fleet, nine cruisers, a third of the fleet's destroyers, five submarines, numerous supply and repair ships, tenders and oilers.

When the Japanese struck, their principal targets were the heavy ships and on these vessels their bombers and torpedo planes wreaked a frightful vengeance. When the attack was over not one of the battleships was capable of meeting the enemy, and the light cruisers *Helena*, *Honolulu*, and *Raleigh* were crippled. While serious damage was done by bombs, torpedoes were the principal cause of the immobilization of the ships. To make sure that these destructive weapons reached their targets in the relatively shallow and narrow confines of Pearl Harbor the Japanese had contrived a wooden fin which prevented deep diving, thus eliminating to some degree the inherent danger that the torpedo would bury itself in the mud on its initial dive; and as further safeguard they employed an exploder designed to function after a very short run.

Midget submarines cooperated in the well-

²The new Net Depots at Melville, Rhode Island, and Tiburon, California, contributed much to the effectiveness of the net program. Student officers and enlisted men, many of whom came to the depot training schools almost directly from civil life, were instructed rapidly and thoroughly in the various types of nets in use. They were familiarized with the details of all net equipment and particularly they were taught how to assemble, install and maintain nets with their moorings, flotation and gate installations. The handling of the various types of nets, which often were laid under emergency conditions, developed into a specialized field of seamanship where even experienced officers had to undergo supervised instruction before they could be called fully qualified net men.

planned attack. At 0530 one of them completed a 60-minute reconnaissance around Ford Island and retired to report its observations to the waiting Japanese Fleet. The two-man submarine inside the inner harbor remained to take part in the actual attack. It was discovered and sunk, but not before it had fired two torpedoes, both of which were wide of the target.

The standard submarine net protecting Pearl Harbor was constructed of 300-foot panels of one-inch mesh rope measuring eight feet on each diagonal. The Japanese midget submarines were especially designed to penetrate this type of defense; they were small in size, employed extensive net cutters, and the whole tail assembly was so arranged as to offer no projection to foul a net. The fact that they entered the harbor through an open gate and made no frontal attack on the net did not obviate their potential effectiveness. A careful examination of the midget beached outside the harbor led to the belief that by cutting one wire in the eight foot diagonal the sub could undoubtedly have penetrated the net without giving any indication of attack.

The Japanese attack raised two questions concerning nets; whether they could be altered to provide protection against torpedoes fired from inside harbor entrances and whether they could be altered to defeat sneak attack. The effectiveness of the net defense system depended in no small degree upon the solution of these problems.

DESIGN OF HARBOR NET DEFENSES TO COUNTER SNEAK ATTACKS

Sneak attacks may be segregated into three distinct classes. The first comprises standard large size submarines and motor boats whose displacement and maneuvering characteristics are such that they attempt to breach defenses by frontal attack, relying upon momentum to burst the nets or booms.

They have large operational ranges and employ torpedoes and mines as the attack weapons. The second class embraces medium or small size submersibles or motor boats which attempt to penetrate the defenses by evasion through openings above, below or around the nets. The largest of this class, equipped with cutters, is capable of a direct assault. The operators, enclosed within the vessels, rely upon the excellent maneuvering characteristics of the craft to gain the position desired to launch their torpedoes or mines. The craft in this category are especially constructed for sneak raids and therefore incorporate all the devices which would be a factor in the accomplishment of a successful mission. A further characteristic is short operating range—some types must be delivered to within twenty miles of the objective. The third category includes submersibles in which the operators are exposed and may dismount and use their hands as desired. The craft in this class are used primarily to transport the operators to the scene of action. They are characterized by small size, slow speed, short range and extreme versatility.

The policy in meeting these threats was to present the most effective barrier against the larger craft while incorporating as many features as possible in the design to defeat the other classes.

Another fundamental point constantly kept in mind by designers was that no net or boom was effective in the sense of being self-sufficient. Nets afford maximum security only when supported by alert net patrol vessels and other defenses equipped to destroy an attacking enemy—the nets and booms merely delay and give indication of danger; other means must be used to apply the *coup de grace*.

In the application of these principles the Bureau of Ordnance early in 1942 reduced the mesh of the submarine net. In order to conserve material and time, this was done

with nets already in use by inserting a one-half-inch mesh rope in such a manner as to quarter each eight-foot mesh. Appropriate clamps were developed and the design modified to support the increased weight of the net panel. Heavy indicator nets, which also employed the eight-foot diagonal, were redesigned to four-foot mesh and the manufacturing slabs adapted to this construction. Fortunately the modification of the design of the light indicator net was initiated before procurement deliveries were made. Designs of skirt and apron nets to be used in conjunction with torpedo and other types of standard net defenses were rushed to completion and furnished additional protection. In keeping with Bureau policy these modifications did not impair the efficiency of the nets against large submarines.

PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL SHIPS

Nets protecting harbor entrances while furnishing adequate security from submarine attack offered no defense against the airplane and its torpedo. The spectacular success of the torpedo plane at Pearl Harbor, as well as at Tulagi and Taranto, vividly illustrated the need for effective individual ship protection inside harbors. The danger was particularly great for moored ships. In early 1942 it was estimated that the normal expectation of aircraft hitting a ship at anchor was one torpedo out of two; a capital ship underway, one torpedo out of seven; and a merchantman underway, one torpedo out of three. The vulnerability of anchored ships to torpedo attacks led the Bureau of Ordnance to place a high priority upon the design, development, and test of nets for individual ship protection.

The individual ship protection (ISP) program, initiated in 1942, was carried out and served a useful purpose until the rapid advance toward Japan introduced new tactical elements which forced the abandonment of

the program as originally planned.

While offering excellent protection against torpedoes, ISP nets afforded no security against limpet mines, bombs, suicide planes, or other suicide devices, and as the offensive approached the Japanese mainland the intensity of these attacks increased. Maneuverability was essential in such attack and even with the most efficient release gear the nets remained an embarrassment to a capital ship wishing to get under way. The ISP nets in use were not a loss, however, as they were employed as additional baffles supporting the primary protection of the anchorage. Procurement of light ISP nets was continued primarily for use as successive baffles for assault stage rapid laying. This application eliminated the net gate and gate vessels, thus reducing the delay involved in passing ships through a gate. At the same time greater maneuverability was assured inside the anchorage.

DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF LIGHTWEIGHT NETS FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Like the Pacific War itself, the net program progressed from a purely defensive to an offensive one. In other words, up to and through a part of 1943 nets were primarily for harbor defense. As the theatre of the Pacific war advanced, it became necessary to modify nets in order to permit them to function at the maximum efficiency at advanced bases and with advance units. The problem was first brought into sharp focus with the shortage of shipping space. Materials were available and trained personnel on hand, but the tremendous weight and volume of nets precluded any but the most important shipments, and these were generally in a rear echelon. Weeks were required for the net tending vessels (AN's) to install the nets as they were assembled by advanced base details usually under extremely adverse conditions. As the tempo of war increased there was a




Diagram of the various types of net defenses.

corresponding demand for lightweight nets which could be laid rapidly. Protection was desired on or near D-Day, not weeks or months later! A temporary net defense against submarines was needed which would aid in the success of an amphibious operation when the initial supplies were being unloaded—when the speed of the advance was measured by the supply of critical items furnished in early echelons.

The first step in the solution of this problem was the development, in the summer of 1943, of an entirely new indicator net. In contrast to the submarine type net which weighed 2,200 tons per mile, occupied 173,000 cubic feet and required special vessels three to four weeks to install, the new light

indicator net could be laid at a speed of three knots; one mile of the net, weighing only eight tons, being carried in the smallest size landing craft [LCV (P)]. The net had sufficient life, seven to ten days, under normal sea conditions, to bridge that critical period when the beach-head was being consolidated. Eighty miles of this net was procured at a cost of approximately \$1,000,000.

The short service life of this net brought a demand for a light-weight semi-permanent submarine net. British heavy indicator net was a fair solution to the problem but its use required special net laying vessels and these were not available since the originally planned AN's had been converted for other purposes. Without these vessels for stowage and lay-

ing, heavy indicator net was not a desirable design for semi-permanent installations. While retaining the indicator features of the heavy indicator net, a new mooring assembly was incorporated in a design which was designated as LSI-2 net. The LSI-2, designed late in 1943, furnished an effective net which could be used in tideways with relatively low maintenance. Service use brought a marked reduction of flotation in the mooring system with a corresponding decrease in the volume and shipping weight of the net. This net was the only type of submarine net in common use at advanced bases.

Torpedo nets were in the same category as submarine nets regarding difficulties of shipping but their importance for harbor defense was assessed at a sufficiently high level that special vessels were designated as net cargo vessels (AKN) and given the task of transporting and installing net material at advanced bases. The AKN's were put in operation early in 1944. Two types were used: the *Keokuk* class, converted from a train ferry, which installed thousands of feet of light but effective torpedo net in a matter of hours, and the *Indus* class, a group of specially designed Liberty ships equipped to assemble and launch a more permanent defense after the initial stages of the attack. These ships took care not only of the primary problem of transportation, but also served as the net depot and assembly area, thus avoiding delays incident to handling and in the establishment of a shore depot. The AKN's were loaded in accordance with each specific mission but the usual load was 10% light indicator, 20% light submarine indicator and 70% torpedo. Several AN vessels were assigned to each AKN to install the net as soon as it was fabricated and launched from the cargo vessel. In this way the time required to lay torpedo nets was reduced from weeks to days, and since the nets were the only cargo on the vessel they could be moved into the

landing area around D-Day instead of in a rear echelon. The operational use of AKN-AN vessel groups was probably the biggest advancement in net and boom defenses since the nets were furnished in sufficient quantity and at a time when the area was a potential submarine and torpedo aircraft target.

A few sample cases are sufficient to illustrate the effectiveness of AKN-AN operations:

- At Saipan, the *Keokuk* laid 10,000 feet of LISP-2 net in 3 hours and 35 minutes.
- At Saipan, the team of the *Tuscan* (AKN) and the *Holly*, *Cinchona*, and *Chinquapin* (AN's) installed 7,373 yards of T-8 net in 19 days.
- At Ulithi the *Tuscan*, *Sagittarius*, *Zebra* (AKN's) and the *Mastic*, *Cornel*, *Viburnum*, and *Winterberry* (AN's) installed 16,000 yards of T-8 net in 28 days.
- At Kossul Passage, the *Zebra* (AKN) and the *Catalpa*, *Cliffrose* and *Winterberry* (AN's) installed 3,160 yards of T-8 net in 6 days.
- At Okinawa the *Sagittarius* and *Tuscan* (AKN's) and the *Aloe*, *Mahogany*, *Chinquapin*, *Snowbell*, *Spicewood*, *Winterberry* and *Abele* (AN's) installed 10,680 yards of T-10 net in 19 days.

In the interest of providing protection as early as possible during an operation, the field developed the method of laying the LISP-2 from the *Keokuk* (AKN-4) and at Saipan the net was actually laid before the reduction of the island, and in time to protect the naval craft engaged in the assault. The nets were stowed in an assembled condition in 1,000-foot lengths and when ready for installing were run out as overlapping baffles. The baffles being temporary were eventually replaced by permanent nets installed by AKN-AN vessels. The use of nets as baffles necessitated a complete investigation of their properties and resulted in information to the field by which the action of the baffles under various sea and current conditions could be predicted and the usefulness of the temporary baffles extended. This use of the LISP-2 net found

much favor with fleet planning officers and became a permanent net defense.

The importance of net defenses at advanced bases is illustrated by the following table:

ADVANCED BASE TORPEDO NETS (T-8, T-9, T-10)

INSTALLATIONS	
Base	Yards
Guadalcanal	1,300
Tulagi	2,700
Espiritu Santo	5,000
Kwajalein	3,100
Eniwetok	8,800
Tinian	4,400
Saipan	9,800
Peleliu	1,000
Ulithi	23,300
Manus	9,000
Philippine Islands	8,500
Okinawa	13,500
Aleutians	30,000

The magnitude of the task, of delivering the tremendous quantities of net material to the destination in the exact amounts required is illustrated by one shipment which comprised eighteen thousand long tons and involved the efforts of four navy bureaus. In fact, the weight and cube of nets and allied equipment shipped overseas exceeded the volume of any other one class of inert ordnance material.

In 1943 it was realized that a staging point at Pearl Harbor should be established for stowage of net materials shipped overseas from the east coast where approximately ninety per cent of the nets were manufactured. In January 1944 a staging point known as the Net Storage Annex was set up as an adjunct of the Naval Net Depot at Pearl. This storage or staging point proved invaluable in enabling the net cargo vessels to keep up with the pace of operations in the Pacific.

SUMMARY

Approximately \$120,000,000 was spent in net and boom procurement from July 1, 1940, to August 14, 1945. At all times dur-

ing this period there was a sufficient supply of material to meet all requirements, though in several instances the productive capacity of contractors was strained to the limit.

From the beginning of the European War in 1939 until mid-1941 the Bureau of Ordnance was concerned primarily in providing designs of proven ability and in procuring sufficient materials to install the necessary defenses. As soon as the installation of the continental defenses began, the interest of the Bureau centered upon problems of fitting these designs to the conditions experienced at actual net sites. Another objective in 1941 was to meet operational requirements for new designs by the rearrangement of standard net components. During 1942 the initial American designs began to appear and fundamental studies of all important phases of net and boom work were undertaken. In 1943 as service experience was gained new methods of achieving the ultimate goal of submarine and torpedo defenses were conceived and reduced to improved designs. In 1944 the commissioning of the AKN vessels advanced the whole field of net and boom defenses, and the streamlining of the heavy nets plus the development of new light ones changed their entire tactical use from a harbor defense unit to a significant part of amphibious operations.

Net and boom defense have advanced tremendously from the early days of 1939 when there were no American defense designs, no modern net material and relatively few trained personnel. At the end of hostilities there were net designs for nearly every operational need, hundreds of trained net officers, thousands of enlisted personnel, a hundred or more special net laying vessels ranging from 10,000-ton AKN's through net layers to net tending tugs and barges, adequate net material, invaluable experience in the maintenance of nets, and a thorough background of the fundamentals applying to all types of net and boom defenses.

THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND AND THE INVASION OF FRANCE

BY GERHARD LOOSE*

The *Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945*, and the *Report of the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, 1946*, contain a number of interesting facts concerning German plans of defense against the Allied invasion of France. These facts were largely obtained, through interrogation, from General Feld Marschall Keitel and Generaloberst Jodl. Additional information, presented below, was furnished by General Feld Marschall von Rundstedt, Commander in Chief West; Generalleutnant Westphal, his chief of staff after September 1944; Generalleutnant Zimmermann, his G-3, and Colonel John, his G-4, after July 1944, in the course of interrogations conducted in May 1945.¹

Von Rundstedt shared the opinion of the German High Command that the Western Allies would attempt an invasion of France. Zimmermann thought that it would be launched in June 1944, but he may well



FIELD MARSHAL VON RUNDSTEDT

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¹Dr. Loose has based his study on a personal interrogation of von Rundstedt and his former staff officers which he was ordered to conduct while serving as an interrogation officer with the 12th Army Group. At that time, May 1945, von Rundstedt lived in retirement at Bad Tolz (Bavaria), where he was charged with the supervision of the disarmed German forces in southern Germany.

have adjusted his prediction to historical fact, whereas his commander claimed that an unorthodox decision would not have surprised him. Von Rundstedt was prepared for the great attack as early as March 1944, despite opinions of his experts, who pointed to the unfavorable weather and tide conditions prevailing during the spring months.

Jodl expected the main thrust to be directed against the beaches of Normandy. Keitel thought the Allies would attack Brittany, thus trying to achieve the additional objective of the submarine bases of Lorient, St. Nazaire, and La Pallice. Zimmermann

again claimed to have guessed correctly; he expected landings in force in Normandy. Von Rundstedt, on the other hand, was prepared for another unorthodox decision: despite Dieppe and the subsequent strengthening of the fortifications in that region he thought an invasion of the Pas de Calais likely. In the event of success, considerable initial losses would have been compensated for by greater strategic possibilities.

A second landing was generally anticipated. Jodl, Keitel, and Zimmermann considered the Pas de Calais the likely area, while von Rundstedt expected additional trouble in Normandy.

After the successful invasions of North Africa, Sicily and Italy, the Nazi press tried to reassure an anxious German population by publicizing the "impregnability" of the Atlantic Wall. Von Rundstedt knew better. The fortifications between the estuaries of the Scheldt and the Seine were as strong as they could reasonably be expected to be. But even the supercasemates that *Organisation Todt* had built there—von Rundstedt called them "church-like," with an undertone of scorn and derision—did not appear to him as impregnable. In Normandy and Brittany the construction program was lagging behind schedule, because labor and materials had been diverted to Germany to repair the damage caused by Allied strategic bombing. The token defenses south of the estuary of the Gironde were no cause of concern since no landing was anticipated there.

Zimmermann concurred with the opinion held by his supreme commander, but there was additional cause for anxiety. Although the casemates were for the most part strong in concrete, they were not always so in armament. In a great number of instances they were armed with old German equipment and a staggering variety of captured pieces of

different make and caliber.² Fire control was thus difficult, while servicing and the supply of sufficient ammunition were even greater problems.

On the eve of the invasion von Rundstedt had about 60 divisions under his command. He felt that in this respect also he was insufficiently prepared for the things to come. With thirteen to fifteen additional divisions he thought he could have repelled the imminent landings. His hypothetical plan for their deployment was as follows:

Mediterranean	2-3	infantry divisions
Pyrenees	1-2	" "
Southwestern France	2	" "
Normandy and Brittany ...	3	" "
Mobile reserves	3	armored " and
	2	motorized "

Von Rundstedt added that if he could have committed these mobile reserves at D + 2 under conditions of unhindered troop movements he would have succeeded in throwing the Allied forces back into the sea. This, of course, is even less than an academic proposition because on that day the Allied air forces had already made good progress toward creating a *Verkehrswüste* (traffic desert) behind the German lines. Von Rundstedt would have taken these divisions from Italy and the Balkans because he considered that holding these areas was strategically unsound.³

Zimmermann was in agreement with his chief. He further referred to the inferior strength and quality of a good number of the German divisions in the West. There were *bodenständige* divisions deployed along the coast whose manpower and armament were generally inferior in quantity and qual-

²Zimmermann could not quite remember whether the number of different types of captured guns used in the fortifications amounted to 30 or 60.

³It will be remembered that the German High Command kept in excess of 20 divisions in each of these

ity.⁴ Furthermore, there were divisions with only two regiments (of three battalions each) or with three regiments (of only two battalions each). An effort had been made to bring these divisions up to strength by attaching to them battalions of Russian prisoners of war pressed into service. These *Ost-bataillone* (East battalions), as was to be expected, gave a poor account of themselves.

The SS divisions—armored with one exception, and with a T/O strength of 22,000—were very good. However, two of them, "Frunderberg" and "Hohenstaufen," were sent to the Eastern front in April 1944 to relieve a difficult situation there. They did not return in time to be properly refitted and regrouped. The regular *panzer* divisions, except one which was equipped with captured armor of inferior type, were also of good fighting quality. Thus even the all-important mobile reserves showed weaknesses. Their efficiency was further reduced by a tactical error: two of the good divisions ("Hitler-Jugend" and "Panzer Lehr") were held as *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht* (OKW) reserves near Paris and released too late.

General Westphal found fault with the deployment of the German divisions prior to the invasion. He would have moved into Normandy the majority of the fourteen divisions then stationed in Belgium and Holland, being confident that the Allies would not attempt a landing north of the Pas de Calais. In view of the fact that von Rundstedt thought he was never given a sufficiently large number of divisions, it is interesting to recall that "From the time of the landing in France to the time the Allies reached the German frontiers, the German armies of the West exceeded numerically the attacking

forces."⁵

German armament, though generally adequate in quality and supply, showed certain serious weaknesses. The use of captured artillery pieces, already mentioned in connection with the armament of the Atlantic Wall, was also fairly widespread in the divisions. Lack of uniformity in allotting this equipment, in servicing, and in ammunition supply created considerable difficulty. According to Zimmerman, a belated attempt was made to reduce the confusing variety of the artillery. John stressed the cardinal mistake committed by German ordnance authorities of experimenting with and producing too many types of equipment.

Motor transport was, too, a serious problem. The Eastern front, owing to great losses and difficult driving conditions, demanded an inordinate amount of vehicles. As a result, an insufficient number of heavy trucks, tractors, and tank retrievers were supplied to units in the west. John explained that in March 1944 newly activated divisions had to be equipped with second-hand motor vehicles. When this officer was transferred to von Rundstedt's staff in July 1944, he found approximately 2,000 different types of German and foreign motor vehicles in use in France, Belgium and Holland. No attempt had been made to increase the efficiency of this colorful motor-pool through a policy of intelligent cannibalizing.

Von Rundstedt and John agreed that supplying sufficient quantities of spare parts was an almost insoluble problem on every active

⁵*Biennial Report*, p. 95. At least during the initial stages of the invasion the Allied High Command was not free to bring into play a preponderance of either men or materiel because "Even with favorable Channel weather, it would have required at least 15 weeks for the Allies to land as many divisions as the Germans had available in Belgium and Northern France." (*ibid.*, p. 32). In this connection it may be pointed out that as of July, 1944, 27 U. S. divisions had been landed in France. (*ibid.*, p. 34). The number of British and Canadian divisions was considerably smaller.

⁴They were called *bodenstaendige* (static) since they were lacking in organic transport.



MAJ. GEN. SIEGFRIED WESTPHAL

front. Three factors contributed to creating this issue: extensive use of captured equipment, production of an excessive variety of German types of equipment, and, most important of all, failure to produce spare parts in adequate quantities.

To improve the motor transport situation, von Rundstedt requested that all automotive vehicles in the West be rigidly pooled. The *Luftwaffe* could have contributed 60,000 tons and the Navy 12,000 tons. These vehicles were generally of better quality than the strained resources of the Army. Air Force and Navy, however, refused to cooperate. Even after D-Day, when the Allied air forces had swept all German planes from the sky, the *Luftwaffe* still refused to help out, whereas the Navy finally proved cooperative.

By comparison the supply of gasoline and lubricants was not critical. According to

John, 10,000 cubic meters of gasoline had been stocked, earmarked for the movement of mobile reserves and the redeployment of other divisions. This quantity was considered sufficient to move fourteen divisions over a distance of 400 kilometers. The strategic reserves amounted approximately to another 10,000 cubic meters. It had been stored in three large surface dumps in the vicinity of Paris-Argenteuil, Bordeaux and Lyon. When John joined von Rundstedt's staff he learned that these reserves had not been relocated, dispersed or stored underground, to say nothing of moving them to strategically more accessible locations. He ordered at once that the dump at Argenteuil be moved into the tunnels of the Paris subway. But before anything could be done about the dumps at Bordeaux and Lyon, the Allied air forces struck, early in August, and destroyed all of the 7,000 cubic meters of gasoline stored there.

Railroad movements had already become a serious problem before D-Day. Von Rundstedt and his staff officers expressed the opinion that the air attacks on the French railroad system prior to and during the invasion were of decisive importance for the success of the Allied campaign.⁶ About three months before the invasion the Allied air forces began to strike and gradually succeeded in boxing in the OVERLORD area. Bombing attacks against railroad installations were made outside of a line running along the Seine to Paris, Paris to Orleans, and Orleans to Nantes. In May 1944 the Seine bridges between Paris and the estuary were subjected to bombardment, similarly the Loire bridges were attacked immediately after D-Day. The effects of these attacks and those

⁶They also agreed that the Ardennes offensive ultimately failed because the Allied air forces succeeded in creating a traffic desert in the German combat and communication zones.

directed against targets deeper in the German communication zone were cumulative. Zimmermann remembered that by the end of June 1944 a traffic congestion affecting about 2,000 trains extended almost to the Rhine.

John was concerned over the railroad problem in the West. He and General-major Hampe tried to devise means of preventing a complete breakdown. In a memorandum they suggested that special reconstruction gangs be formed of workers of *Organisation Todt* and stationed in railroad centers and along trunk lines. Thus additional manpower could be provided for immediate repair caused by air attacks. However, their superior officers chose to disregard this suggestion.

Furthermore, the French railroad workers and officials did their part in reducing the speed and efficiency of rail movements. Yet Zimmermann stated that considering the difficulty and danger under which the French had to work, it was a miracle that there was not more sabotage than the Germans actually encountered. The German High Command had indeed taken some precautions by bringing to France several thousand German railroad workers and officials to supervise and, in emergency, to take over the work of their French colleagues.

The display of Allied air strength before D-Day filled von Rundstedt with feelings of somber anticipation. Although he had the assurance of General Sperrle that his *Luftflotte West* would make an all-out effort to aid in repelling the invasion, von Rundstedt knew that he could not expect much.⁷ Westphal was more specific. He remembered that General Plocher, chief of staff to Sperrle, informed him in March 1944 that the effective strength of *Luftflotte West* was 190 air-

craft. Westphal gave the figures as of D-Day: 200 to 300 fighters and 80 bombers. The figures may actually have been somewhat higher, yet an additional statement made by these officers can be accepted without reservations: by D + 15 the *Luftwaffe* was swept off the skies.⁸

Besides the effects of Allied strategic bombing on German aircraft industry there are additional reasons which help explain the weakness of the *Luftwaffe*. The German air force never recovered the losses it sustained while attempting to blitz England into submission. Pelz, commanding general of the German Bomber Command in the West, did his part in reducing the strength of first-line aircraft through an unsuccessful and costly resumption of the attacks on England in January and February 1944. Goering might have tried harder to step up German aircraft production had he possessed a more realistic appreciation of the growing Allied strength in the air. Both Westphal and Zimmermann accused the OKW and the *Obrekommando der Luftwaffe* (OKL) of negligence and unfounded optimism. Westphal remembered Rommel's trip to the *Führerhauptquartier* in November 1943 where, as the basis of a request for more tanks and airplanes, he submitted an alarming report on the growing strength of Allied armor and air power. Goering was asked to accompany him on his return trip to find a solution to the problem. Rommel's mission completely failed; although Goering admitted that the Americans produced large quantities of ice

⁸General Marshall's Report corroborates this information. Significantly, it mentions the German Air Force only once: "Our long campaign against the *Luftwaffe* had greatly weakened its capacity for combat and, as a result, there was no effective air opposition to our highly vulnerable initial landings." p. 33. General Eisenhower gives specific information: "During the first week of the campaign the (Allied) Tactical Air Forces flew some 35,000 sorties in direct support of ground troops . . ." whereas "the activities of the German Air Force (were limited to) sporadic fighter-bomber attacks by flights of 20 to 30 aircraft in the assault area . . ." *Op. cit.*, p. 28f.

⁷To offset this weakness somewhat von Rundstedt requested additional troops and in April 1944 was allotted 4 infantry divisions and 1 parachute regiment.

boxes and razor blades, he did not believe them capable of retooling their factories. Furthermore, it is known that OKL made mistakes in its production policy.

The organization of the German High Command was not such as to give von Rundstedt clear and strong support. The planning and conduct of operations in the various theaters was divided in a peculiar way: OKW was assigned the Western theaters and the *Oberkommando des Heeres* (OKH) the Eastern theaters. Yet it was of organizational necessity that the decision reached by OKW be implemented by OKH. Moreover, all major decisions were made in the *Führerhauptquartier*, Hitler having the final word. Since the beginning of the Russian campaign this headquarters had been located in the East, first in East Prussia, then in Russia, and finally again in East Prussia. Clearly the Eastern theater presented the most pressing problem. The West did not and could not receive the attention it needed, and von Rundstedt does not appear to have been the man to fight for what he thought he ought to have. Besides Hitler and his inner circle were not the type of people he cared to do business with. When conferences were called at the *Führerhauptquartier* he preferred to send his chief of staff.

Though it might be taken for granted, von Rundstedt was actually not supreme commander in the West. His command did not include the naval and air forces. He had to depend on voluntary cooperation and that, as has been indicated, he did not always get.

The actual task of repelling the Allied landings was assigned to Rommel. He commanded the sector extending from the estuaries of the Scheldt and of the Gironde. According to Keitel and Jodl, disagreement arose between Rommel and von Rundstedt as to the disposition of the mobile reserves. "Rundstedt desired to hold his armored



FIELD MARSHAL WILHELM KEITEL

forces in a group around Paris and Eastern France; Rommel to push them forward to positions in readiness close to the coast. The Rommel view prevailed." Actually a compromise seems to have been reached, for at least two armored divisions ("*Hitler-Jugend*" and "*Panzer Lehr*") were held in the vicinity of Paris, designated, as already mentioned, as OKW reserves. Whatever the case may have been, von Rundstedt claimed that he was in complete agreement with Rommel. However, this statement should be accepted with reservations because von Rundstedt was disinclined to discuss divergencies of opinion that surely existed between him and his officers or his supreme commander, Hitler.

No doubt existed anywhere in the German High Command as to how the invasion was to be met. There could be only one strategy: prevent the Allies from securing a beachhead and throw them back into the sea.

The invasion came and von Rundstedt bent all efforts on carrying out this plan. He failed, and before the month of June was out, he was ordered into his first retirement.

THE FATE OF OUR FIRST MISSOURI

By J. M. ELLICOTT*

The ovations received by our magnificent, up to date, and now historic battleship *Missouri* bring to mind the tragic fate of our first *Missouri* a little over a century ago. At that time she, too, was the most formidable warship in the world, far ahead in design and power of any war vessel built in any other country.

The *Missouri* was a bark rigged, paddle wheel, steam frigate of 2,200 tons equipped with four copper boilers and inclined engines of 600 horsepower, giving her more than ten knots speed under steam alone. She was also heavily sparred for long distance cruising: a picturesque vessel with long and graceful lines and tall masts.

Steamboats with vertical engines of the "walking beam" type had been in use on rivers and lakes for a number of years but the *Missouri*'s designers had discarded that type and placed engines and boilers well below decks. She carried a battery of two 240-pounders, the largest guns then afloat, and ten 68-pounders in broadside.

Completed in 1841, she was outfitted at the Norfolk Navy Yard in the Spring of 1842 and manned with carefully selected officers and crew. A young captain, John Thomas Newton, with three years experience in his grade, was selected to command her, and a newly commissioned chief engineer, John Faron, Jr., outstanding in steam engineering, was appointed her senior engineer

officer. One of his assistants was Theodore Zeller, later associated with Isherwood in designing steam war vessels.

Among the watch officers was Lieutenant John Ancrum Winslow, he who later commanded the U. S. S. *Kearsarge* when she sank the Confederate Cruiser *Alabama*. And another notable officer, assigned to the *Missouri* as her purser, was Rodman M. Price, afterward Governor of New Jersey.

Interest in the *Missouri* had become so widespread that it was decided to make her shakedown cruise an exhibition visit to all important Atlantic ports. Going north first, she spent two weeks in New York receiving ovations comparable to those recently given our present battleship *Missouri*. She then continued as far as Bath, Maine, receiving enthusiastic greetings at intermediate ports. Returning to New York for a slight overhaul, she next sailed for Savannah. There her exhibition cruise was ended and Captain Newton received orders to carry to Vera Cruz a bearer of dispatches for our minister to Mexico.

There may have been an ulterior purpose in selecting the *Missouri* for this mission. There were indications that the Mexican President, General Santa Ana, was preparing to recover Texas by force of arms, and it may have been thought that the presence of our new and formidable warship in Mexican waters might give him pause. A stop was made en route at Havana, probably again with an eye to exhibition, for the Governor General of Cuba and his staff were entertained on board and given a tour of inspection throughout the ship. The call at Havana,

*Captain Ellicott, U. S. N., Rec. prepared his article from personal and official correspondence of the late Rear Admiral John Ancrum Winslow and also from our marine files in the office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy.



Conflagration of the U. S. steam frigate *Missouri*, Gibraltar, August 26, 1845. (From a drawing on the spot by George B. Souder.)

however, was brief, owing to the prevalence of yellow fever in that port.

After six days in Vera Cruz the *Missouri* took on board a return bearer of dispatches for Washington and by some quirk of transportation, a minister extraordinary from the Sandwich Islands. In order to complete the exhibition of the ship in southern waters, she landed her diplomatic passengers at New Orleans. She then visited Pensacola, after which she returned to Norfolk for overhaul, Captain Newton having been informed that he must prepare for a long cruise. While at Norfolk he was given instructions to take Mr. Caleb Cushing, newly appointed minister plenipotentiary to China, as far as Alexandria, Egypt, via Gibraltar and the Mediterranean. From Alexandria Minister Cushing was to continue by other transportation. Captain Newton was further instructed to

make exhibition visits with the *Missouri* to the principal Mediterranean ports. The idea behind the show seems to have been akin to that of Theodore Roosevelt, many years later, when he sent sixteen of our modern battle-ships on a cruise around the world.

The *Missouri* was to be the first naval steam warship to cross the Atlantic, and she was given a great send-off. President John Tyler and a group of distinguished officials accompanied Minister Cushing from Washington and boarded the ship at Hampton Roads. The President continued on board as far as the Capes of the Chesapeake, the national ensign displayed at the main to denote his presence; there being no President's Flag in those days. A recreational stop of two days was made at Fayal in the Azores, and Captain Newton, no doubt, was well pleased to do so in order to replenish fresh provisions

and take on what little coal might be available. After this the *Missouri* headed for Gibraltar.

On a sunny afternoon in the last week of August the British fleet of old three deckers and smaller Nelsonian frigates, looking like floating castles, was anchored in the harbor of Gibraltar under command of Admiral Sir George Sartorius. With it was a small Danish squadron of similar vessels, and some other warships, when a long, sleek, black man-of-war flying the Stars and Stripes, heavily sparred but with all sails furled, glided through their midst at clipper speed, stopped with astonishing suddenness and dropped anchor. Nothing like her had ever been seen in European waters. Officers and crews in surrounding vessels and on the Rock crowded to rails and waterfronts to watch her fire a salute of twenty-one guns to the British port and additional salutes to flag-officers afloat. Official calls were soon exchanged. Admiral Sartorius returning the call of Captain Newton immediately, and was conducted on a tour of inspection throughout the ship. As Purser Price wrote afterward in an article to a New York paper:

No such steamship had ever before been seen. She was, in fact, a veritable steam leviathan. The size of her hull, the beauty of her outlines, her heavy spars, her speed and the gracefulness of her appearance on the water excited the admiration and received the praise of every true sailor.

A two day stay at Gibraltar was necessary to give the Chief Engineer time to coal and to overhaul the engines. During this time the *Missouri's* officers were lavishly entertained afloat and ashore. On the evening of the second day Captain Newton and all officers off duty were dining with the American Consul, Mr. Horatio Sprague, when loud cries were heard in the streets:

"The American steamship is on fire!"

Running down to the high wire fence which barricaded the waterfront they saw a terrify-

ing sight. The *Missouri's* gun ports glowed like open-door furnaces, while billowing, flame-shot smoke rose higher than her masts and spread out into a black canopy to shut out the stars.

The American officers were obliged to run half a mile to the waterport (boat landing) where they found Captain Newton's gig just pulling in to get him. No undue excitement seemed to prevail as the gig approached the ship. The sentry at the gangway hailed "boat ahoy!" to which Captain Newton replied "*Missouri*" and was received by the executive officer and four side boys bearing lanterns.

The situation at once appeared desperate. The steam pumps had become enveloped by flames and the hand pumps were distressingly inadequate. Pumping barges were sent off from shore but could help little. Admiral Sartorius, after ordering all vessels dangerously near the burning ship to be moved, came on board and joined Captain Newton on the *Missouri's* bridge. Realizing the almost hopeless situation the latter sent Minister Cushing with his effects and the ship's papers and money ashore in the gig.

After the fire had been fought for three hours it became obvious that it would soon reach the magazine. Admiral Sartorius urged Captain Newton to abandon ship, but it was only when he became convinced of the useless loss of life that would follow the magazine explosion that the captain gave the order.

Fire fighters below decks dropped out of gun ports and those on deck slid down boat falls and dangling ropes into boats from the shore and from other ships which came crowding around regardless of risk. Admiral Sartorius left the ship and stood by in his barge to await Captain Newton who stood alone on the paddle box silhouetted against the flames. To the Admiral he seemed to contemplate cremation in his beloved ship. At that moment, however, the gig returned with Consul Sprague, pulled alongside the paddle box,

and members of the gig's crew dragged the captain into her and took him ashore.

Hardly had the refugees gotten safely away when a broadside gun, loaded with a saluting charge, went off as if in salute to the ship's departing crew. Immediately afterward, her magazine exploded, lighting up the harbor with a brilliant glare in which her foremast could be seen to fall, carrying the maintopmast with it. Then the *Missouri* sank beneath the waters of the harbor, leaving the scene in utter darkness.

Some of the officers and enlisted men were given shelter on shore; while others were cared for on the British ships, especially the Flagship *Malabar*. Consul Sprague undertook the housing of those on shore. Captain Newton he took into his own house; thus the captain returned in scorched and tattered evening dress to the home in which he had been dining so cheerily a few hours before.

Next morning the entire crew was mustered at the Watergate. Although many were suffering from burns, bruises and lacerations, not a soul had been lost. They presented a pathetic picture, however, some in tattered uniforms or in underwear alone, while others were misfittingly garbed as British officers and sailors.

And then it was learned what had happened. Over the *Missouri's* engines was an engineer store room. Its flooring was of loose boards with open seams between them. In it were stored inflammable oils and waste and some glass demijohns of spirits of turpentine. Under the store room two men were replacing a cylinder head using an open light to see their work. A third man went into the store room for some implement and knocked a wrench from a shelf which fell on a demi-

john, breaking it. The turpentine flooded through the floor seams and was ignited by the flame of the open light below.

There was no cable in those days. Captain Newton ordered Lieutenant Winslow to Washington by the first available mail packet with a full report of the disaster. Meanwhile Purser Price and Consul Sprague worked fast. Within forty eight hours they had chartered the American ship *Rajah*, equipped and provisioned her, and started her with 350 officers and enlisted men for the United States. Another smaller vessel, the *Pons*, was also chartered to berth those retained for salvage work. Divers with wrecking equipment were employed, salvaging the boilers, engines, guns and much other miscellaneous material. Raising the hull was found to be impracticable, so it was blasted to pieces with explosives.

About a year later Captain Newton and Chief Engineer Faron were court martialed in Washington on charges of negligence, the former being sentenced to suspension from duty without pay for two years and the latter for one year. It distressed President Tyler deeply to feel obliged to approve Captain Newton's sentence. They were native Virginians and warm friends and the President had been deeply impressed with the smartness and discipline on the *Missouri*. After five months he remitted the remainder of the sentence with the following published statement:

An important principle having been settled in this case and the measure of punishment being altogether secondary in this the first case arising under the Steam Marine — and considering that there is nothing implicating in the slightest degree the moral standing of Capt. Newton, I direct that the remainder of his punishment be remitted.

HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

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- *O'Sullivan, Maj. Gen. Curtis D., California National Guard
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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

THOMAS JEFFERSON ON UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING

Polemicists on both sides of the issues of universal military training have naturally appealed to American history and tradition as a basic support of their respective positions. In reviewing the historical arguments it seems that there is general acceptance of the fact that such founding fathers as Washington, Hamilton and Knox would approve of universal military training. But by inference and suggestion the Jeffersonian tradition is brought forward in opposition to any such proposal. In the light of the fact that several of the more recent students of Jefferson have neglected his policy on military training—a policy which was an integral part of the achievement of his Presidential administration and which may serve to guide us today—a statement of Jefferson's thinking is enlightening.

When Jefferson took office in 1801 he was faced with certain practical political problems in which America's very honor was at stake. Faced with the pirates of Morocco, Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, with French machinations on our southern borders, in Louisiana and the Floridas, and English threats to the north via Canada, Jefferson took practical measures for defense as quickly as possible. Jefferson, a man whose philosophical background and Revolutionary experience had made him a forthright foe of

European militarism, saw no contradiction to his views in encouraging the construction of a system of coastal fortifications and in approving the organic act, on March 16, 1802, establishing the Corps of Engineers and the United States Military Academy. He felt that only in this way could he strengthen and support America's new-born liberty and independence and logically fulfill his earlier career as Revolutionary Governor of Virginia. In terms of lasting influence these acts certainly rank among Jefferson's most important achievements.

In 1802 Jefferson wrote to Jonathan Williams, Chief of the Corps of Engineers and Superintendent of the Military Academy at West Point, an appreciation of Williams' energetic promotion of the study of military art. Jefferson expressed the opinion that such study was very important considering the inadequately small size of the Regular Army. He continued his encouragement throughout his administration.¹

¹"MS Minutes and Records of the United States Military Philosophical Society, 1802-1813," New York Historical Society, include two hitherto unpublished letters of Jefferson, dated 1802 and 1805, showing his support of the objective of the Society which was "... promoting Military Science." See also Sidney Forman, "The United States Military Philosophical Society, 1802-1813," *The William and Mary Quarterly* (July, 1945).

Jefferson, in 1810, wrote from Monticello to General Thaddeus Kosciuszko, giving an account of his stewardship in building up a system of defense. He tells of having repeatedly recommended to Congress to have "... the whole territory of the United States organized by such a classification of its male force, as would give to the benefit of all its young population for active service, and that of a middle and advanced age for stationary defence."²

Jefferson's views were elaborated in a letter to his friend James Monroe on June 18, 1813. He wrote then: "It is more a subject of joy that we have so few of the desperate characters which compose modern regular armies. But it proves more forcibly the necessity of obliging every citizen to be a soldier; this was the case with the Greeks and the Romans, and must be that of every free State. Where there is no oppression there will be no pauper hirelings. We must train and classify the whole of our male citizens, and make military instruction a regular part of col-

legiate education. We can never be safe till this is done."³

Jefferson's testimony manifested in his writings piles up to leave no room for uncertainty or equivocation. It was Jefferson who wrote the Rockfish Gap Report of the Commissioners for the University of Virginia which recommended "... and the manual exercise, military manoeuvres, and tactics generally, should be the frequent exercises of the students in their hours of recreation. It is at that age of aptness, docility, and emulation of the practices of manhood, that such things are soonest learned and longest remembered."⁴ His views were written into the regulations of the University of Virginia and before his death military training was regularly given at the University.

At least on this issue American tradition reveals Washington, Hamilton, Knox and Jefferson standing united.

SIDNEY FORMAN,
Archivist, U. S. Military Academy.

REBIRTH OF THE BRITISH TERRITORIALS¹

With the coming of the New Year 1947, Britain's citizen army, the Territorials, or more affectionately, the "Terriers," was reborn. On January 1 it regained its individual identity after losing it for seven years of merger in the wartime army, and from now on it will be more important than ever. For the first time it will be as fully balanced a fighting force as the Regular Army itself. It will have its armored divisions, and even an airborne division commanded by the

leader of the men of Arnhem.

What a feast of memories, glorious and sad, of battle epics and traditional pride, of ignoble jokes about "Saturday-afternoon soldiers" and noble praise for conquering heroes, its rebirth recalls! Many of them passed through my mind as I sat in the headquarters, overlooking Whitehall's Cenotaph, of Major-General R. E. Urquhart, double D.S.O. leader of Arnhem, who till his recent appointment to command the Terrier Airbornes, had for some months been Director

¹Based upon "Rebirth of an Army," by John Cashel, originally published in *Everybody's Weekly* (London); contributed by British Information Services.

²*The Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, A. E. Bergh, ed., (Washington, 1904-1907) vol. 12, Feb. 26, 1810, p. 368.

³*Ibid.*, vol. 13, June 18, 1813, p. 261.

⁴*The Complete Jefferson*, Saul K. Padover, ed., (New York, 1943), p. 1104.

of this new army, advising Britain's War Office on its reconstitution.

The Territorial Force, as it was then called, was created by Lord Haldane "for defense only," in 1907. It was designed to make the whole of the British Regular Army free for use as an expeditionary force for overseas service in the event of the Kaiser's threatened war. Before that Britain's volunteer citizen soldiers lacked the importance and cohesion of a national force.

The volunteer idea goes back to the reign of Henry VIII, who in 1537 granted a charter to certain gentlemen of the Guild and Confraternity of Saint George, to be "Overseers of the Science of Artillery, that is to wit, for Long Bowes, Crosbowes and Handgonnes." The guildsmen became better known as the Honorable Artillery Company, which is the oldest formed body now included in the Army List and is unique in being nearly a century older than the senior regiment of the British Army—the First Foot, the Royal Scots. But the date from which most battalions of the Territorial Army trace their history is May 12, 1859, when General Peel, as Secretary for War, signed a letter addressed to the Lords Lieutenants of the Counties, sanctioning the raising by them of organized and formed bodies of volunteers.

Lord Haldane used these as the nucleus on which to build an army. He has been described as Britain's greatest War Minister, and certainly he belonged to a Ministry in the grandest Liberal tradition. He was a remarkable man, of tremendous physical as well as mental vitality, who thought nothing of walking to Brighton and back during a weekend. He toured every part of Britain, declaring open his drill halls and calling for recruits.

Thousands answered his call when the war for which he had prepared broke out in

1914. There being more men than equipment and supplies, they sampled the comfort of a waterproof sheet and a single blanket serving as mattress on a concrete floor! For sentries there was at first but one overcoat, the goer-on duty borrowing it from the goer-off!

The year 1914 proved to be the great test for Haldane's "Saturday-afternoon soldiers." It was thought that six months would be required to get them fit for battle, for, although they had been recruited only for home service, the call for overseas volunteers became inevitable after the retreat from Mons. Yet within two months many of the Terrier battalions were in France; within three the London Scottish were making their historic charge in the first battle of Ypres.

The Artists' Rifles were over there as well. They were so good, and things so desperate, that Kitchener, immediately they had landed, turned them into an Officers' Training Corps, and privates became lieutenants and were posted to other units in the field overnight. The 51st (Highland) Division, as great a worry to the Germans in that war as in this last one, were always found to be named among the first six battle-winning divisions of the British Army on every captured list circulated by the enemy to his commanders. And of the 52nd (Lowland) Division John Buchan wrote: "There is something in the northern blood which can kindle to a whirlwind vigor, so that quiet citizens find themselves for an hour or two berserkers, and a battalion will utterly astonish itself and its commanders."

A quick march past will show whether we have forgotten the last battle records of some of the best known Territorial divisions:

The 44th (Home Counties: flash—a scarlet oval) who took a terrific hammering at and before Alamein; the 50th (Northumbrian—T.T. in red on a black square), desert rats and first infantry division ashore

on D-Day; the 51st (Highland—H. D. inside a red circle on a dark blue ground),—St. Valery, Africa, southern Italy, Normandy, the Rhine; the 52nd (Lowland—white cross of St. Andrew on a blue shield)—from D-Day onwards into Germany; the 53rd (Welsh—red W for Wales)—Caen, Falaise, Rhine estuary dykes, and into the hole made by Rundstedt's last offensive in the Ardennes; the 56th (London—Dick Whittington's cat)—pursuit of Rommel and through Italy.

This new Territorial Army will be a completely self-sufficient force, with its former twelve infantry divisions replaced by an airborne, two tank and six infantry divisions, five anti-aircraft groups, independent brigades, engineer formations, corps and army troops. A wise concession to tradition will allow converted units to incorporate their original name in their new title, officers and men to wear their former cap badges and buttons, and one battalion formed from two to keep both battalion numbers.

General recruiting began on May 1, and for three years the force will consist only of volunteers. Then, under the conscription scheme, men who have served in the British Army for eighteen months will become Territorial soldiers for five and a half years. But the more senior unit officers, warrant officers and N.C.O.s and some specialists will continue to be chosen from volunteers.

Before the war the force numbered 212,000 officers and men, and it is expected that the new volunteers will bring it up again to about the same strength, while, when the Conscription Act is passed, those serving under it are likely to swell the total to around three-quarters of a million. That will make it a much more formidable force than ever before, by far the largest single group among all defense forces of the Crown, which is one reason why the British Army is going to need so much training space.

There is expected to be less of that reaction against recruitment which normally follows a war than some think. Formerly there were many whose creed was to leave spare-time soldiering to others. Now there is full backing from all parties for the voluntary effort, even if a minority still shy at the conscription principle.

"The Government attaches tremendous importance to the future Territorial Army. It occupies a far more significant place in our plans than before, both in military calculation and in civilian imagination," Lord Pakenham, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for War, told the Council of Territorial Army Associations.

No single thing will fire the imagination of the young more than the appointment of Major-General Urquhart, Leader of Arnhem, to the command of a volunteer division unique of its kind in the world, the 16th Airborne, a new number formed by placing together the numbers of the famous 1st and 6th. It will be recruited from every part of England, Scotland and Wales, unlike other Territorial divisions, which are distinguished by their local character.

When he was still a major, General Urquhart was transferred from the Highland Light Infantry to the Army's first adventurous and experimental airborne in the black autumn after Dunkirk. Two years later, in the invasion of North Africa, he was a brigadier of the 1st Airborne Division and he fought his way back to British lines through forty miles of enemy country after landing with a force in a vain effort to seize Tunis. He fought with his airbornes through Sicily and Italy, but it is the Arnhem epic when he went down with his men, that will bring him volunteer airbornes. Here is certainly an ideal man to have in one of the most important posts of this great new citizen army.

JOHN CASHEL

NOTES ON THE INSIGNIA OF THE TWENTY-FOURTH CORPS

The Original Civil War Insignia

The XXIVth Corps was originally organized in the Civil War, during the latter part of the Richmond Campaign of 1864-1865. Its initial activation took place during the reorganization of the Army of the James, which included the disbandment of the Xth and XVIIIth Corps. These two formations had been composed of white and Negro units. On December 3, 1864, the War Department, under Presidential direction, deactivated the two mixed corps, and reorganized the white units of both to form the newly designated XXIVth Army Corps. The Negro units of the two disbanded corps were likewise consolidated to form the newly organized XXVth Army Corps.¹ Both the XXIVth and XXVth Corps were assigned to the Army of the James.² The former, with the insignia of which these notes are primarily concerned, continued as part of that field force until it was deactivated on August 1, 1865.³

Under its original commander, Major General Edward O. C. Ord,⁴ the XXIVth Corps does not appear to have received any official distinctive insignia or badge. Major General John Gibbon, who assumed command in March, 1865, wrote later that until



The Civil War XXIV Corps cloth cap patch; red for 1st Division, white for 2nd Division, blue for 3rd Division. Reconstructed from descriptions in John D. Billings, *Hardtack and Coffee*, and contemporary photographs.

he took command, "the corps, unlike all those in the Army of the Potomac, had not been assigned a badge."⁵ The two former corps, from whose elements the XXIVth had been formed, had previously been assigned their own badges during the summer of 1864.⁶ It is possible that during the first months after activation of the XXIVth, its troops may have worn their old badges. This would not seem likely, however, if the purpose of corps insignia at the time—the ready identification of troops in the field and the maintenance of unit morale and *esprit-de-corps*—were carried

¹General Orders No. 297, War Department, Adjutant General's Office, December 3, 1864, *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Series I, Vol. XLII, Part iii, p. 791. (Hereinafter cited as O.R.)

²"Organization of Troops in the Department of Virginia and North Carolina [Army of the James]", O.R., Series I, Vol. XLII, Part iii, pp. 1123, 1126.

³General Orders, No. 131, War Department, Adjutant General's Office, July 28, 1865, O.R., Series I, Vol. LVI, Part iii, p. 1315.

⁴General Orders, No. 1, HQ XXIV Army Corps, December 4, 1864, O.R., Series I, Vol. XLII, Part iii, p. 802.

⁵Major General John Gibbon, *Personal Recollections of the Civil War* (New York, 1928), p. 290.

⁶General Orders, No. 18, HQ X Army Corps, July 25, 1864, O.R., Series I, Vol. XI, Part iii, p. 453; Circular, HQ XVIII Army Corps, June 7, 1864, O.R., Series I, Vol. XXXVI, Part iii, pp. 688-689; General Orders, No. 108, HQ XVIII Army Corps, August 25, 1864, O.R., Series I, Vol. LI, Part i, p. 1179.

out. The other elements, those comprising the Negro units of the old disbanded corps also remained with the Army of the James, and were now assigned to the XXVth Corps. This corps did not adopt a badge until February 20, 1865.⁷ Therefore, if all the troops of the old Xth and XVIIIth Corps had continued to wear their original badges at the same time, there would have been no physical means of distinguishing elements of the two new corps, the XXIVth and the XXVth, except for the obvious difference in the color of their skins, and this would not have been applicable in the case of officers, since the Negro units were officered by white personnel. Regardless of speculation, and in the absence of extant available records to the contrary, it appears evident that no distinctive badge or insignia for the XXIVth Corps was adopted until March 18, 1865. On that date General Gibbon, who succeeded to command at the time,⁸ published his General Orders No. 32, which under authority of the Commanding General, Army of the James, prescribed an official insignia for the corps.⁹

The design selected was described in these general orders as "the heart." The orders was silent as to the size, the material from which the badge was to be made, and the part of the uniform on which it was to be worn.¹⁰ It may be safely assumed that similar to the established custom of many corps in the Federal armies, it was to be fashioned of cloth and worn on the cap or hat. Gen-

eral Orders No. 32, did, however, assign a distinctive color to each of the component divisions of the corps, and thus followed the standard practice of corps in the Army of the Potomac and other Federal field armies. So, in addition to the adoption of the heart symbol as distinctive to the XXIVth Corps, the order created separate division insignia for the three component divisions: for the First, a red heart; for the Second (then designated as the "Independent Division"), a white heart; and for the Third, a blue heart.¹¹ The order, however, failed to prescribe either a separate color or combination of colors for the Corps Headquarters, staff, and corps troops who were not part of the several divisions, and thus omitted a practice customary in other corps of the several Federal armies.

The selection of the heart as the badge of the corps seems to have been intended to represent a high order of morale and to have been an expression of a deep personal and mutual feeling of regard and solidarity among the troops of the corps. A paragraph of Gibbon's order stated that "the symbol . . . testifies our affectionate regard for all our brave comrades—alike the living and the dead." The design held another element of significance: a representation of wholehearted and steadfast devotion to the Union cause. "A cause," the order declared, "which entitles us to the sympathy of every brave and true heart, and the support of every strong hand."¹² Possibly the symbolism in the selection of the insignia of this corps reflected more sentimentality and abstract ideas than did most of the other badges adopted by units of the Federal Armies, which often had their symbolic origin in more conventional, practical, or material backgrounds.

F. STANSBURY HAYDON.

⁷Orders [unnumbered], HQ XXV Army Corps, February 20, 1865, O.R., Series I, Vol. LI, Part i, pp. 1201-1202.

⁸General Orders, No. 42, War Department, Adjutant General's Office, March 20, 1865, O.R., Series I, Vol. XLVI, Part iii, p. 52.

⁹Published in O.R., Series I, Vol. XLVI, Part iii, pp. 33-34; and in Gibbon, *Personal Recollections*, pp. 290-291.

¹⁰General Orders, No. 32, HQ XXIV Army Corps, March 18, 1865, O.R., Series I, Vol. XLVI, Part iii, pp. 33-34.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 34.

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 33.

The Present Day Insignia

The XXIV Corps of the Second World War was constituted and authorized for activation March 30, 1944,¹ and activated at Schofield Barracks, T.H., on April 8.² Its first and, to date, only commander was Major General John R. Hodge.

On the 22nd of that April the Heraldic Section of the Quartermaster General's office wrote the Commanding General of the Corps suggesting two rather conventional designs for shoulder sleeve insignia.³ In the meanwhile the Corps had been giving thought to the same problem and on May 3d General Hodge wrote to Washington proposing two other designs, both apparently submitted by personnel of the Corps and both attempting to symbolize an organization of artillery and infantry about to fight the Japanese. Both of the Corps' designs carried the Roman numerals "XXIV."

The letters crossed in the mail. None of the four proposed designs were acceptable to the respective recipients of the letters. General Hodge did not feel the Quartermaster designs related in any way to his Corps, while the use of numerals on shoulder sleeve insignia was contrary to Army policy. The Corps commander replied to the Quartermaster on July 8 submitting a fifth design with a radical departure. During the intervening weeks it appears that he and his staff had been reading histories of the Civil War and had discovered references to the distinctive insignia worn by the Union Army corps numbered XXIV in that conflict. In Frederick Phisterer's *Statistical Record of the*



The modern XXIV Corps embroidered shoulder sleeve insignia; bright blue and white.

Armies of the United States he found a drawing of the heart-shaped badge (it appears on page 61), but unfortunately no colors were given. As a result he suggested blue and white, colors he believed to have been used in the Civil War on the insignia of other army corps. All ideas of symbolizing "bravery (red) and fidelity (blue)" and "the setting sun of Japan (red) and the Pacific Ocean (blue)" were abandoned in favor of simplicity and tradition.

The new design met a friendly reception in the War Department and was approved by the Quartermaster General on August 15. Its authorization carried this official description:

On a shield 2 7/8 inches in height a white heart, a blue heart and a white heart superimposed one upon the other as per record drawing. The design is an arbitrary design and is in the colors of the Corps.

Attached to the authorization, however, was the clear warning of the military historian: "The design has been approved for

¹AG 322 (28 Mar 44) OB-I-GNGCT-M, dated 30 March 1944.

²G.O. No. 92, Headquarters, U. S. Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area.

³All official correspondence concerning the adoption of the World War II insignia is included in QMG file 21.4—24th Army Corps Insignia."

the XXIV Corps as a design and is under no circumstances to indicate that there exists any historical connection between the present XXIV Corps and the XXIV Corps of the Civil War." In due course the insignia was

manufactured and supplied to the Corps. It appears to have been first worn by its members about February 1945, following the Leyte Operation.

FREDERICK P. TODD.

CAP SLEEVE OF A MEXICAN GRENADIER

In Mexico, as in other parts of the Spanish colonial empire, the Seven Years' War—resulting in the temporary loss of Manila and Havana to the English—clearly showed the need for a complete reorganization of the Spanish military establishment. The new form decided upon for the colonies consisted of a small force of regulars supported by a large provincial and urban militia, and this form was kept until the final loss of the majority of the colonies in the early part of the nineteenth century.¹

The grenadier cap sleeve, or flash, shown in the accompanying illustration, is an interesting relic of this colonial militia force. It was once worn by a soldier of the Mexican provincial militia infantry Regiment of Córdoba, Orizava y Xalapa. The regiment was created in 1796-97 through the reformation of the Regiment of Córdoba y Xalapa, which had been raised prior to 1775. The Regiment of Córdoba, Orizava y Xalapa was known later by another designation: the Regiment of Tres Villas.²

The provincial militia regiments of infantry of this period consisted of two battalions of five companies each—one grenadier and the rest fusilier companies. From 1792

until the end of the Spanish regime all wore a uniform described as follows: "Blue coat



Mexican grenadier cap sleeve.

¹"La organizacion del ejército en Nueva España," in *Boletín del Archivo General de la Nación* (Mexico, 1940), XI, 617-63; Felipe Zuñiga y Ontiveros, "Estado Militar de Nueva España," in *Calendario manual y guía de forasteros de Mexico* (Mexico, 1787-1821), *passim*.

²*Boletín, op. cit.*, p. 652; Zuñiga y Ontiveros, *op. cit.*, *passim*; "Estado Militar de España," in Spain, *Calendario manual y guía de forasteros en Madrid* (Madrid, 1794), pp. 98, 171.

with red collar, cuffs and lapels. A narrow gold lace on the collar. Gilded buttons. White breeches and waistcoat." Black hats with red cockades were worn by the fusilier companies, while the grenadiers wore fur caps. The Spanish form of the grenadier cap, by the middle of the eighteenth century, evolved from the original cloth cap with a rim of fur into a high black or dark brown fur cap with a cloth sleeve or bag hanging down the back.¹ This sleeve was usually the

color of the regimental facings with the regimental coat of arms embroidered on it and a design of lace and embroidery of the color of the buttons. The sleeve ended in a tassel of the same color as the lace and embroidery.

The grenadier cap sleeve illustrated is of red cloth with the coats of arms of the cities of Córdoba, Orizaba and Xalapa embroidered in silk. Above is the royal crown of Spain, and surrounding the coats of arms is a scroll that bears the legend "R. Y. P. DE LAS TRES VILLS." The design on the sleeve is of yellow lace and embroidery. The yellow tassel is now missing.

DETMAR H. FINKE

QUERIES AND REPLIES

REGIMENTAL HISTORIES OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ARMY (Spring 1947): A standard work on regimental histories of the Austro-Hungarian Army through the 19th century is Major Alphonse Freiherrn von Wrede, *Geschichte der K. und K. Wehrmacht: Die Regimenter, Corps, Branchen und Anstalten von 1618 bis Ende des XIX. Jahrhunderts* (6 vols., Vienna, 1898). There is a copy in the Library of Congress.

Another answer to this query comes from Fritz Kredel. He owns a book titled *Schematismus der K. u. K. Armee und K. u. K. Marine*. It is a *Rangliste* of officers with short histories of the different regiments. It

is the last of its kind, being dated May 1914, on the eve of World War I. The passage of regimental traditions and histories from the Imperial forces to the little army that followed World War I is covered in a well-illustrated book published by the Austrian War Office entitled *Überlieferungspflege im Bundesheer* (Vienna, 1931).

BENEDICT ARNOLD DOCUMENTS: A helpful reply to this query (April, 1947) has been received from Mr. Robert Stanley Watson, Ann Arbor, Michigan, who has searched the large collection of Arnold material in William Clements Library of American History, Ann Arbor.

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THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Dark December, by Robert E. Merriam. (New York: Ziff-Davis Publishing Company. 1947. Pp. 234. \$3.00.)

The reputation of *Dark December* as a piece of serious history suffers because of the extravagant claims made for it by its publishers. By stating that this is "the first complete story of the greatest battle in the history of man," and by indicating that the book is based on all the documents in the War Department which relate to the Battle of the Bulge, they invite criticism which *Dark December* would have escaped otherwise.

Dark December is doubtless the best popular account of the Battle of the Ardennes which has yet appeared. It is more readable than any official history will probably be. The author has drawn heavily on personal interviews with Allied and German commanders, on his knowledge of the terrain, and his use of many of the official documents. While his enemy information is by no means complete, it helps him to reveal clearly the German intent in making the breakthrough. He has made an important contribution to history in placing the battle of Bastogne in proper perspective, and in giving credit to the 1st, 2d and 99th Divisions for their decisive work on the north flank of the Bulge during the first few days of the attack. His evaluation of Allied intelligence for the ten days before the counterattack constitutes one of the most balanced accounts which has appeared on the subject.

The publishers imply that Mr. Merriam had a staff under him which prepared a complete history of the Ardennes from all the Allied and German documents, and that *Dark December* is a condensation of "five great volumes" which the War Department has hidden away in its files. Mr. Merriam, who served for eight months as a member and for a few weeks as head of the Ardennes section of the Historical Division, makes no such claim. Actually, he has drawn heavily on those phases of the story which he wrote for the Historical Division, and has filled in the broad outlines of the rest of the book from scattered information. The five great volumes mentioned in the

publisher's blurb do not run beyond December 20, 1944, they have not been edited, and they will require at least two years to complete. Even these incomplete studies were not available to Mr. Merriam after he left the army in the winter of 1945.

It is essential that the above statements be made because of the possibility that the book will be accepted as a quasi-official source. Since Mr. Merriam did not have access to all the documents, he has made a number of errors of fact which, while they may not nullify his broad interpretations, disqualify his book as a source of precise information on the Ardennes fight. Some of the typical errors are:

Mr. Merriam says that on August 1 General Bradley assumed equal status with General Montgomery—a newspaper statement which was denied at the time by Supreme Headquarters. As a matter of fact Mr. Merriam indicates two pages later that General Montgomery was still giving orders to General Bradley's forces as late as mid-August. The official change did not come until September. In speaking of the fight for the Roer River dams, Mr. Merriam says that Schmidt, which controlled the approaches to the key dam, was taken in the early drive to the German border (which was in mid-September), when it was not taken until early November.

In order to indicate the nature of panic created by the breakthrough, Mr. Merriam declares that First Army Headquarters moved from Spa on the night of December 17, leaving secret papers and personal weapons behind. While I am not informed on the matter of paper and weapons, I do recall that personnel of First Army did not move until the 18th and that they were sufficiently unhurried to serve a pretty good lunch that day. It might be noted, also, that they remembered to take along the records on which Mr. Merriam bases much of his story of this period.

To show the effectiveness of the parachute unit headed by Lieutenant Colonel von der Heydte (who is described by Mr. Merriam as a Rockefeller fellow in New York, and by the unit which

captured him as a Carnegie fellow at the University of Vienna), Mr. Merriam says that an entire combat command of the 3d Armored Division stayed for nearly a week in the area north of the parachute landings to guard against attacks. In reality, this combat command relieved the 18th Infantry so it could join the fight in the south. This regiment had been held back with elements of the 5th Armored Division to deal not with rumors, but with substantial bodies of infantry which had penetrated the thin ranks of the 102d Cavalry Group — a cavalry group whose work, which can be compared favorably with that of the 2d and 99th Divisions, is not mentioned by Mr. Merriam. The 3d Armored Division was present for part of three days and then was relieved by elements of the 5th Armored Division. A glance at the G-3 journal of the Corps involved would have avoided most of the errors noted here.

The book's great weakness, in view of the claim that it tells the complete story of the Bulge, lies in the fact that it gives only three pages to the story of the Allied counterattack in the month of January. Since nearly 20 pages are given as background on the July-September period, it seems that the author, despite his obvious lack of material on the latter phases of the battle, should have devoted more space to the January battle.

If the reader wants a popular and readable account of the Bulge, based on some of the official documents, he should buy *Dark December*. But if he is looking for something complete and authoritative, he will have to wait for the official account.

FORREST C. POGUE,*
Washington, D. C.

Letters from Lee's Army: or Memoirs of Life in and out of the Army in Virginia during the War between the States. Compiled by Susan Leigh Blackford, annotated by her husband, Charles Minor Blackford, and edited and abridged for publication by Charles Minor Blackford III. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1947. Pp. 312. \$3.50.)

The title of this book is in a sense misleading, for the letters written from Lee's army — by Captain Charles Minor Bradford — constitute only a

part of it. Letters written to the Captain by his wife, Susan Leigh Blackford, from their home in Lynchburg, from Charlottesville, where she visited, and from various other points, comprise a substantial portion of the volume. And where necessary to fill in the gaps, those responsible for putting the book together have not hesitated to draw on reminiscences of Captain and Mrs. Blackford, written long after the war, and the diary of Captain Blackford's father, who died during the course of the conflict.

The story told in this volume is not as exciting as that recounted in the recently published *War Years With Jeb Stuart*, which traces the experiences of Captain Blackford's brother, William W. Bradford. But in some respects it is a more important story. The moving descriptions given by Susan Leigh Blackford of the anxiety and the deprivations of the homefolk throw light on an aspect of Civil War history that is far less well known than camp life and military operations. The dire effects of inflation on the middle and lower classes, the resentment growing up between displaced persons (significantly called "roughagees") and their reluctant hosts, the susceptibility of the soberest people to fantastic rumors during time of stress, and the gradual yielding to accumulating misery of the South's will to resist — these are some of the points projected by Mrs. Blackford with a sharpness rarely achieved by narrators covering the home front of the Confederacy.

Captain Blackford gives some revealing glimpses of Stonewall Jackson, and occasionally offers surprisingly shrewd comments concerning high-level governmental and military policy. But on the whole, he serves the cause of history less admirably than his wife. Of Longstreet, to whose staff he was appointed late in 1862 in the capacity of Judge Advocate and about whom all too little is known, he tells almost nothing of consequence. The role of "Old Peter" at Gettysburg, which in after years was to be the occasion of such heated controversy, is treated in a few unilluminating lines. Nor does Captain Blackford's account give much help to the reader who is interested in the working of military justice in the Confederacy. His treatment of battles and marches during the period when he commanded a cavalry unit is relatively full and exceedingly interesting, but this phase of Confederate history has been amply covered by others.

The manner in which the account in its present form was prepared leaves much to be desired.

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The original documents—the location and history of which are not told—were printed privately in the 1890's by Susan Leigh Blackford. The extent and nature of her editing is not revealed, nor is the reader told, except very indefinitely, when the reminiscent passages connecting the letters were written.

The present work is an abridgement and an editing of Mrs. Blackford's work by her grandson. Little information is given concerning the scope and the character of the grandson's editorial work. No attempt is made to identify names mentioned in the narrative and the background material is not of the sort expected and desired by the intelligent reader.

The various compilings and rewritings of the material unfortunately have taken away some of the flavor of first-handedness, if not some of the authenticity. Some of the judgments set forth in the narrative have an aptness that savors more of hindsight than of contemporaneity. And it is a bit difficult to keep from lifting an eyebrow when place, date and "we heard" are ascribed to the story—claimed after the war by so many others as a part of their experience—about the soldier yelling to a Unionist girl who dared to drape herself in the Yankee colors: "Look here, Miss, you'd better take that flag off ... Because ... these old rebs are hell on breastworks."

But these strictures, offered only as impressions, may not be fair. And even if they are, *Letters from Lee's Army* is still a book of considerable value, especially to readers who are interested in the inter-relations of military and civilian aspects of the Confederacy.

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The Coast Watchers, by Eric Feldt, (Melbourne and New York: Oxford University Press. 1946. Australian ed., Pp. 425; American ed., Pp. 264, \$3.50.)

This book tells the story of the now almost legendary Australian coast watching organization, a branch of Australian Naval Intelligence. Equipped with specially constructed radiotele-

phone sets, the Coast Watchers operated largely in enemy-held territory. During the course of the New Guinea and Solomons campaign of World War II, they afforded the allied forces engaged in the fighting an intelligence service without parallel in the annals of warfare. They reported on enemy movements and dispositions as they observed them personally, often with enemy patrols at their heels and execution the price of capture. By giving timely warning to advanced and thinly held positions of enemy air attacks in preparation or already on the way from areas beyond the range of allied radar equipment or patrolling aircraft they enabled our forces to prepare for these attacks to best advantage, and to smash them with the utmost loss to the enemy.

Written by a man with intimate personal knowledge of the men and events he describes, the book is of great value. As former head of the Coast Watchers, Commander Feldt is the person best qualified by position and experience to write their story. Not only did he organize the coast watching service, but he selected the individual coast watchers for their posts of duty, and during the war closely supervised their activities. Besides being head of the organization and writing from official sources, he knew most of the coast watchers personally, and as a former official of the Australian Mandated Territory of New Guinea who had travelled extensively in it and in Papua, knew also the territories in which they operated.

Commander Feldt's account is a reliable one. As a high ranking officer of Australian Intelligence, he is to be trusted not only when he writes of the work of the Coast Watchers, but also when he describes the battles in the South and Southwest Pacific in whose winning they played so invaluable a part. Through his *Coast Watchers*, he was in a matchless position to know all that was going on in the islands, and his factual straightforward story indicates that he made good use of his opportunities in that regard. Here indeed, the book makes its greatest contribution, for it sheds a new and authoritative light on matters that hitherto have been obscure or overlaid by a deep incrustation of legend, journalistic or otherwise. A case in point is the story of Rabaul: its capture by the Japanese, and the Dunkirk-like evacuation of the remnants of its garrison to New Guinea. The full story—a deeply moving one—

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is told here for the first time, and from the most impeccable source—the Coast Watchers who helped in the evacuation. And even in the case of the better known South and Southwest Pacific actions, the book rarely fails to add something significant to the record. It should be added that the Commander writes well; that he has a feeling for the right word and the telling phrase; that he has a lively and irrepressible sense of humor which often helps to point up his story; and that his manner of presentation inspires confidence in his accuracy and judgment.

The American edition, considerably less in length than the Australian, although better arranged and more easily read, loses in the process of condensation much of the flavor of the author's personality. Those who want the complete story would do well to consult the Australian edition, as some of the editorial changes and deletions appear to have been made to save space.

There can be little doubt that *The Coast Watchers*, in either edition, is to be welcomed as a significant and extremely valuable addition to the literature of the Pacific War.

SAMUEL L. MILNER.*

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The Greek Dilemma, by William Hardy McNeill. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co. 1947. Pp. 291. \$3.50.)

This presentation of the Greek situation is accurate as well as timely. The author has, with great fidelity, traced the formation and development of the main political parties, as well as the satellite parties, and portrays the political confusion now existent in that unhappy country. He has treated American participation with great modesty. His picture of the principal actors in the Greek drama checks quite closely with the impressions I formed from my slight acquaintance with them in 1946. They are still active and are still directing the affairs of Greece. His statements on UNRRA and its activities, together with its "curiously blighting effects on government economic policy," should prove extraordinarily interesting reading in view of the various missions which this country is sending to Greece. In order to be in a position to supervise effectively the

expenditure of sums already appropriated, they must, to a degree, follow along the paths broken by UNRRA.

His characterization of the British intervention in the affairs of Greece as "highhanded" does not affect his estimate of the stabilizing influence of the British in the country. British influence is not suffering materially by the arrival upon the scene of the various United States missions. From my observations it seems that British advice may perhaps lose some of its mandatory force but the geographical position as well as the strategic importance of that area to Britain force a lively British interest. He makes it very clear that Greece is crouching apprehensively in the shady area between two worlds and that the play of international politics dictates the internal political situation to such a point that it is impossible to extricate the one from the other. The statement with respect to the Allied Mission for Observing Greek Elections and the results of the canvasses of electoral lists are quite accurate. I was the Chief of the Combined Staff, American-British and French, as well as a member of that Mission. Contrary to the author's statements, it is my feeling that we did not overlook such things as the staff of interpreters. Actually, I took with me from the United States six (6) Greek-speaking Army officers whose job it was, among other things, to supervise the interpretation by the interpreters recruited in Greece, and I doubt very much whether there was much hoodwinking of observers by interpreters. On the other hand, the point which is made that Greeks, being queried as to their political parties, registrations, etc., were inclined to answer in the way they thought the questioner wanted was anticipated but was insuperable.

On the whole I find this book full of interesting data, painstakingly compiled, and I can say in the words of the G.I. "That's the way I heard it." I recommend it for instructive reading.

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Washington, D. C.

Our Vichy Gamble, by William L. Langer. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1947. Pp. 412. \$3.75.)

Our Vichy Gamble gives the history of the diplomatic relations between the United States and France, from the collapse and armistice of 1940

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to Darlan's death in December, 1942. The study was authorized by Secretary Hull and begun during the war. It was concluded after hostilities had ceased and after using captured enemy documents and the record of the Petain trail for treason. An elaborate foundation of archives and published sources underlies a well-proportioned book. The author defends a thesis: that diplomatic relations with Vichy were first begun as an expedient, then continued because of the substantial advantages to the United States, and culminated in the success of our invasion of French North Africa.

What were the substantial advantages? They were the valuable intelligence of Axis activities, effective pressure upon Marshal Petain to counterbalance that of the Germans, a certain measure of aid and comfort to French patriots, and some influence in preserving from Axis use the French Fleet and parts of the French empire. Was our pressure or influence determining? Historical evidence is unlikely ever to yield a categorical answer to such a question. Would we have had these advantages had we turned from Vichy to DeGaulle?

Similar questions arise concerning the effect of the Vichy relationship upon our success in North Africa. Certainly we could not have gained the ready access to intelligence which we possessed under the Economic Accord if we had broken with Vichy, and we may doubt that the resistance movement would have been so well related to our forthcoming invasion had our own agents been driven underground. Thus we could infer that the decision itself to undertake Operation TORCH would have been postponed, or that once undertaken, it would have been less accurately planned.

If we had linked our own effort with the DeGaulle movement to the extent advocated after the event by many critics of the Vichy policy, the operations in North Africa would, of course, have been bloodier, slower, and correspondingly damaging to the subsequent schedule of Mediterranean campaigning. It is hardly demonstrable that the end of the war would have been hastened by the effects elsewhere of an unqualified acceptance of DeGaulle alone as the French leader with whom the Allies would deal. It must remain a matter of belief rather than proof. In characterizing "the only real arguments" against the Vichy policy as "arguments of a sentimental or ideological character," not to be compared favorably with the practical advantages derived from that policy, Dr. Langer seems to approve what at one point he calls "a sensible, purely opportunist policy." He

may be warranted in this view but to the reviewer the issue seems to be more one of short-run versus long-run gains, the latter having much to do with what the war was being fought for. The crux of the issue, however, is the blindness to the value of DeGaulle's movement in 1943, the prolongation of the authoritarianism and collaborationist influence in North Africa, and the correspondingly more difficult relations with DeGaulle that were eventually established. Our Vichy policy, extended, may be held responsible in large measure for these misfortunes.

GEORGE FREDERICK HOWE,*
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The Air Weapon, 1914-1916, by John R. Cuneo. (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1947. Pp. 397. \$5.00.)

In 1942 Mr. Cuneo published Volume I of his *Winged Mars* series. The book was a detailed discussion of the German air weapon from 1870 to 1914, with some attention to British and French interest in aviation. Volume II, *The Air Weapon, 1914-1916*, takes up the story in the late summer of 1914 and carries it through 1916. But, unlike the first volume which dealt largely with beginnings, theories, and lighter-than-air craft, *The Air Weapon* is a solid story of air operations and organizational developments in time of war. Its central figure is the airplane, although the dirigible comes in for plenty of attention. About equal consideration is given to the German, British, and French air arms, with brief mention of the Russian air force.

The author wisely has separated strategic operations from tactical, and has divided the latter into two parts: over land and over the sea. Three-fourths of the book is concerned with air operations in close coordination with ground forces. This is the right proportion, but unfortunately the air forces were so small and their operations so few that only a limited part of the long section is concerned strictly with air—most of the discussion is of ground operations, and at times the author has had to write several pages of troop movements in order to bring in one air mission. On the other hand, this has the advantage of presenting a summary of the first two years of the war with a new factor added, the airplane; it is a welcome departure from earlier histories of World War I which pretty much ignored the new weapon.

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In the period covered the airplane was distinctly a reconnaissance vehicle, and one whose significance was not appreciated until trench warfare in 1915 ended ground mobility and closed out the cavalry as the eyes of the army. As the airplane demonstrated its value — air intelligence more than once provided the key information that led to accurate plans and to victory in battle — its operations were extended and broadened. The gaining of air supremacy over an area became a matter of major importance. A few foresighted men began to think of the plane as an offensive weapon. Even strategic warfare was initiated, although only the Germans persisted, and they depended upon dirigibles. (Unfortunately for the next generation British defenses soon gained the upper hand over the dirigible and established the idea that strategic operations offered little threat to the homeland).

The Air Weapon is good sound history. Its scope and detail make it a reference work of great value to the student of military strategy and tactics. It is an honest document, pointing up the failures no less than the successes of the air weapon, exploding some of the myths of air power built up by its opponents as well as by its exponents, and taking an occasional crack at prejudices. It throws new light on the contributions of the air weapon in World War I. Finally, it is fine background material for an understanding of many of the theories and arguments which revolved around the airplane in the 1920's and '30's, and which even today have not been settled to the satisfaction of all concerned.

There are countless maps. But many of them carry so much detail that they are confusing. There is also a unique system of notes, wherein a note never gives the source used by the author, but instead refers to a numbered document in a separate section entitled "References."

Some readers will find *The Air Weapon* rather unexciting. If so, it is because air operations in the first two years of the war were seldom exciting — except to the handful of daredevils who flew the shaky crates of that day. But by its very sobriety the book has yet another value: it modifies the old notion that all air operations consisted of spectacular individual combats and makes it plain that even in its baby days the airplane was essentially one part of a combined team, a weapon which offered a new means of winning battles and wars.

ALBERT F. SIMPSON,
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Their Mothers' Sons, by Edward A. Strecker, M.D., A.M., Sc.D., Litt.D., LL.D. (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co. 1946. Pp. 220. \$3.00.)

Here we have a book which has for its aim the exposure of the great American Mom, that strange and pathological figure who differs so greatly and so tragically from the Mother of Spartan history. The target, as it is defined by the author, is a broad and somewhat amorphous one, and the missiles which he launches resemble nothing so much as handfuls of gravel. He is vague, in other words, about the exact size and shape of the thing which he is describing, and his verbal attacks upon it consist for the most part of unsupported and undocumented generalities.

I suspect that this arises from the fact that the doctor is a humane and a commiserating man, and as such I have no wish to quarrel with him. I could wish, however, that he had been more specific, even at the expense of omitting some of his gentle, deft verbal slaps.

The chief value of the book, I believe, lies in the fact that it brings a problem out into the open and suggests fields for intensive study. None of those fields receives from the doctor more than a quick, generalized treatment, but the fact that he indicates them and their connection with his central thesis—that Mom is bad for the son and, therefore, bad for the country—more than justifies the writing and the publication of the book.

The doctor suggests, for instance, that there may be some link-up between momism and the more mawkish aspects of modern education. The implication is that Mom's gentle and implacable hand has got a firm and blighting hold there, and my own suggestion is that she has succeeded through the medium of the Parent-Teacher Associations, those parasites upon the educational corpus. How much of the sweetness and light and reasonableness which have replaced the horrid discipline of yesteryear, when a young intransigent either toed the line or got smacked on the chops—how much of that modern sweetness is due to the tireless gentle efforts of Mom? Parenthetically —has anyone pondered the dismal circumstance that the era which gave us the Eighteenth Amendment gave us also the Nineteenth?

Again, to what extent has Mom been responsible for the fact that it has become unfashionable and faintly discreditable for a man to say "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori"? How deeply is she linked up with the fact that when the country stood in terrible danger, it was neces-

sary even for us to sugar-coat the word "conscription," so that when the unwilling youth of the country was run to earth and crammed into uniform, he was "selected" instead of "conscripted" and became known, with emetic coyness, as a "selectee"? What did she have to do with that pair of national disgraces—the O.H.I.O. clubs of 1940-1941, and the hysterical yammerings for the return of poor little Joe almost before the guns had cooled off in 1945? I suspect that she had plenty to do with it, and I want to see her hide pegged out to dry on a teepee.

The doctor, worse luck, shows no comparable interest in taxidermy. The book might have been written by a restrained and gentle Mencken, for it is little more than a volume of timid prejudices. But I repeat that it has value, and I suggest that it continue to be read and pondered.

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Soldiers' Album, by Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy and Lt. Col. Herbert Bregstein. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1946. Pp. 173. \$5.00.)

This is a thumbnail picture story of a phase of the war in Europe which more than three million American soldiers shared with our allies of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces. A successful attempt has been made here to give a graphic account of events from the beginning of Operation OVERLORD, the launching of the invasion of Europe at Normandy, to the final collapse of Germany's war machine almost a year later.

Pictured with the stark reality that only photographs can portray are the spirit, the horror and fear of combat; the abject misery of war-torn nations and defeated legions. Opening with the first penetration of *Festung Europa* at the Omaha and Utah beaches, the story carries the reader through the days of the great breakthrough at St. Lo, Avranches and Caen to the Falaise Pocket where General Patton's armor and the infantry closed in on the only remaining Nazi strength south of Paris.

The tense moments of the liberation of Paris are well illustrated and the scene is shifted northward as the Allied armies, spreading from the border of Switzerland to the North Sea, moved toward the Rhine. Then, in mid-winter, came the dark days at Bastogne followed by the drive to the Rhine. The Third Reich's last barrier was breached

at Remagen only after costly and disheartening battles at Roer, Worms, Colmar, Saarbrücken and other points along the front.

After the Rhine the tides of war were punctuated by scenes of a devastated country, glimpses of the last acts of terrorism by a fleeing Gestapo. The disillusioned Wehrmacht was rounded up and Nazi leaders taken as war criminals. Then Allied forces from the west met the Russians at Torgau on April 26, 1945. Berchtesgaden was captured by the Americans.

The Allied sweep across Germany overran the might of Germany's war machine. Its materiel cluttered the roads, filled great acres of supply dumps. But the greatest abominations to be uncovered were the concentration camps—Buchenwald, Dachau—which became the symbols of Nazi fascism.

Lastly are pictured the surrenders, to the Allies in the north on June 5 and to General Devers' Sixth Army Group in Austria the next day.

General Eisenhower insisted throughout the European campaign that "there were no such things as air war, ground war, naval war." *Soldiers' Album* bears this out by showing the close cooperation between all forces. The many highly dramatic photographs show what some G. I.'s saw and others only heard about. Some of the illustrations are obviously posed and there are one or two minor inaccuracies, but, on the whole, the book very well tells the story of a war as it was fought; pictures the robust humor and love of fun that the American soldier carries with him even into battle. Even to veterans of the Pacific Theater of World War II this pictorial history will be of interest, if for no other reason, to acquaint them with how the other half lived.

The authors of this "soldiers' album" with 150 pages containing almost 400 photographs are Colonel R. Ernest Dupuy, who was General Eisenhower's public relations officer at the opening of the campaign and later head of the SHAEF Press News Room in London, and Lieut. Col. Herbert Bregstein, chief of still pictures for the SHAEF public relations office. The well-condensed text and running commentary by Major Merrill Panitt are augmented by a fine group of strategic maps by Samuel H. Bryant.

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